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ABSTRACT 
 
To effectively prevent and mitigate the outbreak of natural disasters is a more pressing issue in 
the twenty-first century than ever before. The frequency and cost of natural disasters is rising 
globally, most especially in developing countries where the most severe effects of climate 
change are felt. However, while climate change is indeed a strong force impacting the severity of 
contemporary catastrophes, it is not directly responsible for the exorbitant cost of the damage 
and suffering incurred from natural disasters -- both financially and in terms of human life. 
Rather, the true root causes of natural disasters lie within the power systems at play in any given 
society when these regions come into contact with a hazard event. Historic processes of isolation, 
oppression, and exploitation, combined with contemporary international power systems, interact 
in complex ways to affect different socioeconomic classes distinctly. The result is to create 
vulnerability and scarcity among the most defenseless communities. These processes affect a 
society’s ideological orientation and their cultural norms, empowering some while isolating 
others. When the resulting dynamic socio-political pressures and root causes come into contact 
with a natural hazard, a disaster is likely to follow due to the high vulnerability of certain groups 
and their inability to adapt as conditions change. In this light, the following discussion exposes 
the anthropogenic roots of natural disasters by conducting a detailed case analysis of natural 
disasters in Haiti, Ethiopia, and Nepal. 
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Chapter One: Vulnerability and Natural Disasters in the 21st Century 
 
Natural disasters are among the greatest threats to humanity in the twenty-first century.  
People of different cultures and nations are increasingly affected by climate change and 
vulnerable to the consequences of severe environmental hazards. However, history has illustrated 
that the negative impacts of events such as famine, floods, disease epidemics, hurricanes, or 
earthquakes are not felt equally by populations residing in the regions hit. The ability for many 
individuals, especially in less developed countries (LDCs), to successfully adapt to the crises 
repeatedly appearing in the media is determined predominantly by the ways people are able to 
express their needs and opinions towards government. Social, political, and economic factors are 
largely what determine how people structure their lives -- not the natural environment. In this 
sense, natural disasters are the result of two factors: the political, social, and economic processes 
of exclusion and marginalization rooted within a region’s history, on the one hand, and the 
immediate impact of the environmental hazard itself on the other.1 As a means of explaining the 
causes of disasters, one must look beyond the environmental triggers of a crisis, instead 
dissecting the socio-political systems, both domestic and international, that create people’s 
vulnerability to disasters in the first place. If the international community is to effectively 
address the prominence of natural disasters in the modern era, disaster analysis must 
acknowledge that these crises are never purely natural occurrences. Rather, they are deeply 
embedded within the power structures of international relations and diminish people’s resilience 
to environmental shocks or hazards in dynamic ways.  
                                                
1 Piers M. Blaikie, Ben Wisner, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and 
Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994), 22. 
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Globalization has indeed proven a powerful force in promoting human development, yet 
it has also generated a great amount of risk and vulnerability in the daily lives of many 
communities. People are increasingly moving between borders and countries are becoming more 
interdependent. Mass migration and urbanization are the product of different social and political 
environments, and these prompt trans-national vulnerabilities which are only exacerbated by 
environmental degradation and climate change. For example, at the turn of the twenty-first 
century, ethnic strife and battles over lucrative mineral resources tore apart the Congo, Sudan, 
South Sudan, and Darfur, displacing millions of people. These politically and economically 
rooted conflicts forced innumerable individuals to suffer from chronic malnutrition, physical 
displacement, as well as various biological diseases including cholera and HIV/AIDS. Every 
day, families across the world are resettling to urban centers in search of work. Rapid 
urbanization and unregulated development is putting a rising number of people at risk, something 
which the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, India indicates. This single quake killed approximately 
18,000 people, injured another 167,000 and destroyed nearly 400,000 homes.2 Such are 
outcomes predominantly based in patterns of urban settlement -- not in the nature of the quake 
itself.  
The political, social, and economic frameworks within which different groups of people 
exist determine how they interact with their environment. Some may, due to financial 
circumstances, be forced to inhabit regions of high-susceptibility to disaster, while others may 
have to accept a physically dangerous job without health care compensation to enhance family 
incomes. In these instances, the risks involved in people’s daily lives are directly influenced by 
                                                
2 K. Sudhir, Jain et. al., The Republic Day Earthquake in the land of M. K. Gandhi, The Father of the Nation 
(Kanpur: Department of Civil Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, 2001). Available at: 
https://www.nicee.org/Bhuj.php Accessed: September 8, 2016. 
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the political, social, and economic constraints placed upon them through historic processes of 
exclusion and exploitation. 
By comprehending how power and agency may shape a community struck by disaster, 
one acquires a deeper appreciation for the socio-political root causes of people’s vulnerability to 
disaster.  Colonialism is one of the greatest examples of such processes. The institution has 
engendered both past political trends and even the current ideologies and prejudices inherent to a 
community. Vulnerability is thus centuries in the making. Colonialism creates clear historical 
consequences that constrain different communities’ potential for economic stability, ultimately 
limiting the capacity of oppressed and marginalized demographics to adapt under modern 
environmental crises.  
The 1975 earthquake in Guatemala City is just one illustration of this insight. Here, 
colonial practices of indigenous exclusion and persecution forced the native populations into a 
state of abject poverty. Severe discrimination and marginalization against the indigenous lasted 
far beyond the colonial era, however, and this caused a majority of indigenous Guatemalans to 
settle into shantytown hamlets along eroded, dangerous terrain.3 Naturally, it was this region that 
suffered the worst damages from the quake. Such histories illustrate why disaster analysis must 
acknowledge how vulnerability is structured through people’s mundane daily existence. 
Systematic interactions between social, environmental, political, economic, and institutional 
actors play an integral part in defining the allocation and distribution of resources across society 
through a diverse chain of temporal and geographic spheres.4 
                                                
3 P. Susman, P. O'Keefe, and B. Wisner, “Global disasters, a radical interpretation,” In Interpretations of Calamity 
from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology, ed. K. Hewitt (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983), 263-283.  
4 Piers M. Blaikie, Ben Wisner, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and 
Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994), 2-15. 
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For the purposes of the following discussion, vulnerability is defined as the socially-
constructed risk of a population, itself the result of myriad interactions between political, social, 
and economic elements of history. The term natural disaster represents the combined effects of 
natural hazards (the storm, earthquake, etc.) upon a demographic region of high risk and 
insecurity. The all-encompassing occurrences of a disaster engulf various aspects of human life, 
affecting the environmental, social, economic, political and biological conditions of a community 
in dynamic ways. A population’s vulnerability to disasters is thus a pivotal concept in 
ideologically translating the multidimensionality of disaster into concrete circumstances of life. 
By viewing disasters through this lens, one may begin to assess the processes which precipitate 
such outcomes in order to delineate policy proposals for both the prevention and mitigation of 
future disasters. 
To this day, the Irish Potato Famine is an exceptional illustration of how a society’s 
underlying cultural orientation creates the preconditions necessary for a disaster to strike. During 
the mid 19th century, the Irish population were required to produce exclusively one variety of 
potato under oppressive British rule. However, compulsory monocrop production left many Irish 
citizens with little financial capital and limited livelihood opportunities. When a vicious disease 
decimated the potato crops over a period of years, the Irish were left to starve. A famine resulted, 
due to the fact that few other crops were produced domestically under the mono-cropping policy, 
and also since the British prevented food aid from entering the region.5 In the end, 1.5 million 
Irish died and an additional two million emigrated, representing one of the worst famines in 
recorded history. This event exposes the explicitly political and economic nature of the disaster, 
as it was precipitated by British biases against Irish citizens and the subsequent marginalization 
                                                
5 Mark Thornton, "What Caused the Irish Potato Famine?," The Free Market,  May 20, 2008. Accessed August 29, 
2016. 
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of the Irish people. Under different socio-political circumstances, the Irish populations which 
perished in the famine would likely have lived longer and enjoyed a better quality of life. In this 
sense, culturally-specific forms of discrimination surrounding the allocation of welfare or relief 
are highly influential in exacerbating the consequences of a natural hazard to cause full-scale 
disasters.  
Even so, a complex array of factors, many of which are overlapping and interdependent, 
each play a decisive role in determining how individuals and communities can choose to respond 
to the outbreak of an environmental crisis. The creation of popular vulnerability to disaster is a 
multilevel and multi-scalar process, the roots of which lie in the trans-generational oppression, 
inequalities, and marginalization of a community. In many ways, the same social and cultural 
processes that give rise to vulnerability are enmeshed within the broader international economic 
and political systems of capitalism and globalization.6 Examples of such concepts include: the 
Native American tribes residing near abandoned uranium mines in the United States, the 
indigenous Amazonian tribes who are currently facing the consequences of careless oil dumping 
by Texaco, or the millions of central Africans who are daily terrorized by armed warlords 
seeking to dominate lucrative mineral trades -- to name a few. The economic institutions of the 
Western marketplace often create insecure access to some of the most vital resources amongst 
the marginalized and impoverished communities of underdeveloped nations, creating ample 
space for conflict and exploitation. 
 This is especially the case in regards to goods such as clean water. On a global scale, the 
rapidly accelerating commodification of water has led many to argue that such is a human right 
and should not be considered an economic good, since the market forces of capitalism are not 
                                                
6 Piers M. Blaikie, Ben Wisner, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and 
Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994), 23-24. 
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sufficient to guarantee the commodity’s resilience under the outbreak of a natural hazard. By 
turning water into a private good, property rights and market mechanisms only guarantee access 
to clean water for those who can afford to pay a premium. Even so, under disaster conditions 
access to clean water becomes highly unpredictable -- even for the upper classes with the 
financial means to acquire it.  
Such was the case in Egypt during the late 19th century, when malaria spread rapidly 
through the British-engineered irrigation channels that allocated “premium” water to the sugar 
and cotton plantations of the Upper Nile.  Although designed to maximize economic efficiency 
and serve private enterprise in the region, the Nile River control projects also enabled malaria 
infected mosquitos to easily jump between barriers, taking advantage of the recent irrigation 
works that changed patterns of water use and inadvertently made the disease more transmittable.7 
Combined, drought and the wartime lack of nitrate fertilizer around the Nile basin created a 
politically-based famine which, when combined with the modern irrigation systems of privatized 
water, led to the death of over 600,000 individuals.8  
The political ecology of land rights and notions of property ownership are also crucial to 
understanding the vulnerabilities of certain populations to disasters. In many rural and 
developing regions across the globe, land is the primary means of production used to generate a 
family’s income. For these communities, land is also the main asset that farmers have to 
accumulate wealth and transfer it to future generations.9 In order to industrialize economic 
                                                
7 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002).  
8 Ibid. 
9 B. Nega, B. Adenew and S. Gebre Sellasie, Current Land Policy Issues in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian 
Economic Policy Research Institute, 2003), 103-124. 
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output, however, governments will often redefine patterns of land distribution and accessibility 
rights, reducing the livelihood security of many pastoral communities.  
Such is the current situation of the majority Oromo population in Ethiopia, whereby 
recent government development programs have been met by peaceful protests against the 
widespread displacement of Oromo farmers. In this instance, the ability for Oromo villages to 
access the lands and waterways which have been worked by their families for generations is 
being restricted by the state without adequate compensation. The Ethiopian government 
conducted these land grabs as part of the Addis Ababa Master Plan, which initially promised to 
bring great economic growth to the region through industrialization and foreign direct 
investment. Although the Plan has indeed boosted GDP growth substantially, it is very unpopular 
amongst rural peasants.10 Economic growth in Ethiopia has come at the expense of traditional 
land tenure practices. This led to great insecurity surrounding Oromo livelihoods by preventing 
large parts of the population from conducting their traditional forms of pastoral agriculture. One 
outcome of the Oromo’s destitution has been an excessive increase in the group’s vulnerability to 
hazards such as drought or disease. The usurpation of traditionally communal farmlands has 
overturned prior notions of land access and entitlement, severely restricting the Oromo’s ability 
to bring their herds to the fields and lakes upon which they have relied for centuries. Thousands 
of villages are left increasingly vulnerable to disasters, while the government’s violent 
crackdown in response to the protests has created poignant civil unrest. An increasing number of 
people have fled Ethiopia and sought refuge in neighboring African countries such as Malawi or 
Sudan.11 Yet, the changing movements of mass numbers of people, especially under the 
                                                
10 Felix Horne, Such a Brutal Crackdown -- Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia’s Oromo Protests (New 
York: Human Rights Watch, 2016). 
11 This information was gathered during interviews conducted with Felix Horne of Human Rights Watch and Bonnie 
Holcomb of the Oromo Studies Association between June 1, 2016 and August 5, 2016. 
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conditions of violent warfare felt throughout the central and east African region, exacerbates the 
transmission of disease epidemics and people’s vulnerability to disasters; thousands have died 
while many others have become stateless refugees.  
The instances cited above illustrate how the resource allocation patterns of any given 
society are central to determining a people’s vulnerability to disaster. These patterns are 
expressions of the dominant ideologies which govern international mediation between the 
society concerned and government.12 Practices of resource distribution indicate where, when, 
how, and to whom goods and services (including social capital) are allocated. Those affected by 
a hazard face less risk and vulnerability to disaster when more of society’s resources are easily 
accessible. Therefore, political and economic power interact with social customs and cultural 
tradition to constrain the array of livelihood opportunities and coping mechanisms available to 
different groups or individuals at any given time. People who are viewed with negative social 
biases, who are of a marginalized identity, or of a low-income bracket, face restricted access to 
resources and capital. Such status limits their capacity to cope when the outbreak of an 
environmental hazard strikes and inevitably propels a community’s experience of natural hazards 
(a hurricane, flood, drought, etc.) from a state of severe weather to a crisis-level disaster. This is 
especially the case for people with little political or economic influence in society, like the 
indigenous groups of the Guatemalan highlands, residents of Brazil’s informal favela 
communities, or any of the 65.3 million displaced refugees around the world.13 Such individuals 
wield less power to demand assistance when needed, being both disenfranchised, marginalized, 
and many even stateless. They are also often forced to also accept risky or unsafe living 
                                                
12 Greg Bankoff, Georg Frerks, and Dorothea Hilhorst, Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development, and People 
(London: Earthscan, 2004), 2. 
13 Adrian Edwards, “Global Forced Displacement Hits Record High,” UNHCR News, June 20, 2016. Accessed on 09 
September 2016. 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html  
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conditions due to lack of education or out of financial necessity. The divergence in various socio-
economic classes’ access to social goods and material resources alter the opportunities they face 
to improve their livelihood and diminish overall risk to disasters.  
One potent illustration of this phenomena, the effects of which are still apparent to this 
day, lies within the communities most gravely affected by Hurricane Katrina. Approximately 5.8 
million people lived in the areas struck hardest by the hurricane, and more than one million of 
these individuals lived in poverty prior to the hurricane’s onset.14 Those who suffered most were 
families who, due to economic constraints, could not easily adapt or cope with the unexpected 
changes to their environment. US census data confirms that African Americans made up a 
disproportionate share of the hurricane’s victims: about one in three people who lived in the 
areas hit hardest by the hurricane were African American.15 Further analysis also indicates that 
thirty-five percent of black households in New Orleans, and nearly sixty percent of poor black 
households, lacked a vehicle with which to evacuate.16 This data exposes the embedded racial 
constraints of American culture, forcing certain demographics to have no choice but accept 
riskier living conditions and fewer economic opportunities -- the consequences of which are 
clearly greater vulnerability to natural disasters.  
Contrastingly, families hit by Katrina who were well educated, and therefore held well-
paying jobs, could afford to hurricane proof their homes and evacuate the area immediately when 
notified of a severe hurricane warning. Of all the white non-Hispanic households in New 
Orleans, only 15 percent lacked a vehicle.17 While many families held savings accounts and 
                                                
14 Arloc Sherman and Isaac Shapiro, Essential Facts About the Victims of Hurricane Katrina (New York, NY: 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2005). 
15 Ibid. 
16 US Census Bureau, Federal Emergency Management Assistance in 2000 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2000). 
www.censtats.census.gov/data/LA/04022.pdf . Note: designated "Black or African American” includes individuals 
who specified more than one race. 
17 Ibid. 
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insurance agreements which gave them the financial support necessary to recover from Katrina, 
those on fixed incomes often lost their livelihoods and all assets in the storm. With Hurricane 
Katrina in mind, it becomes clear how natural disasters are defined by the underlying social, 
political, and economic forces of a community. These factors figure centrally in creating crisis-
level outcomes. The effects of such dynamic socio-political pressures affect populations across 
the world, in developed nations as much as in LDCs, for social inequality and marginalization 
are traits inherent to every nation state, no matter how big or small.  
In this sense, it is important to understand that environmental hazards are naturally 
occurring events, while disasters are not. Disasters, rather, are the complex physical 
manifestation of underlying social, political, and economic inequalities (such as irregular urban 
settlements and weak regulatory practices) that render a society less resilient to shocks from 
hazards.18 Such inequalities often times force people to also accept unsafe and unsanitary living 
conditions. The result of such trends is to exacerbate the destructive effects of a hazard -- both as 
it occurs and throughout the process of recovery -- heightening the vulnerability of the 
marginalized or low-income populations affected. Such is especially the case in economically 
and politically underdeveloped states whose governments lack the capacity to respond or to 
implement institutional forms of civilian support and security. Therefore, multiple factors are 
central to assessing a people’s risk and vulnerability in relation to disaster: where they live and 
work, the level of government protection from hazards, collective preparedness to address 
environmental threats, the knowledge base of a community, as well as an individual or 
population’s wealth, class, gender, age, ethnicity, migrant status, and overall health. Many more 
                                                
18 Dorothea Hilhorst and Greg Bankoff, "Theorizing Vulnerability in a Globalized World: A Political Ecological 
Perspective," in Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development, and People, eds. Greg Bankoff, Georg Frerks, and 
Dorothea Hilhorst (London: Earthscan, 2004), 2-3. 
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conditions also determine the severity of risk and vulnerability which people face, and each of 
these elements plays a dynamic, interdependent role with others to generate the modern disasters 
we see today. 
As the Red Cross exposed in the World Disasters Report 2001, the impact of extreme 
natural events upon countries with high, medium, and low scores on the Human Development 
Index (HDI) is indicative of how a people’s vulnerability to disaster correlates with their access 
to society’s goods and resources. The HDI is a marker of development which emphasizes that 
people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a 
country, not economic growth alone. As such, the HDI provides a summarized measurement of a 
nation’s average achievement in key dimensions of human development. These include: living a 
long and healthy life, being well-educated, and having a decent standard of living. It is important 
to note, however, that the HDI simplifies and captures only part of what human development 
entails. Therefore, it is a tool to gain insight rather than a clear marker of regional vulnerability 
and levels of development. The HDI does not reflect upon inequalities, poverty, human security, 
or empowerment, but rather offers other composite indices as a broader proxy on some of the 
key issues of human development, inequality, gender disparity, and human poverty.19  As a 
conceptual tool, the HDI can thus be used to question national policy choices: how can two 
countries with the same level of gross national income (GNI) per capita end up with grossly 
different human development outcomes? 
As the 2001 UNDP report indicates, extreme environmental hazards which triggered the 
deadliest natural disasters across the world were experienced predominantly in countries with 
low HDI scores (approximately two thirds of all deaths from hazards reported between 1991 and 
                                                
19 United Nations Development Program, UNDP Human Development Reports (Geneva: United Nations 
Development Program, 2015). Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi  
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2000). In the last decade of the 20th century, approximately 2,557 natural disasters were reported 
to the UN, and more than half were in countries of medium human development (MHD).20 
However, two-thirds of all deaths reported to the UN during this timeframe came from countries 
of low human development (LHD), and only two percent came from highly developed nations.21 
Clearly, there is a recurring divergence between the hazards reported and the casualties incurred 
amongst LHD, MHD, and developed states. 
It also important to note that the for the purposes of this report, the United Nations 
categorized both China and India as medium development countries. Yet these states each 
experience high levels of inequality, poverty, and environmental insecurity; in various ways 
India and China are subject to many of the same demographic and environmental instabilities of 
LHD states. While both states are considered MHD countries by UN standards, World Bank 
Data confirms that a vast portion of both countries’ populations are politically marginalized and 
suffer from severe poverty as well as poor access to healthcare and education.22 Combined, these 
constraints indicate that the populous, low income communities of India and China may often 
reside in regions of high risk to environmental catastrophe. These people are the most vulnerable 
to disasters due to their disenfranchisement, marginalization, and economic insecurity. The 
irrefutable correlation between low HDI scores and a population’s vulnerability to disasters 
highlights why disaster analysis must acknowledge the prominent role of social and political 
forces in exposing people to risk and making them more vulnerable to disasters. It is essential to 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
21 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report 2001, eds., 
Jonathan Walter (Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2001), 162-170. 
Available at:  http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/WDR/21400_WDR2001.pdf 
22 The World Bank Group, Inequity Report on China (Washington D.C.: The World Bank Group, 2016). 
http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/CHN. 
The World Bank Group, Inequity Report on India (Washington D.C.: The World Bank Group, 2016) 
http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/IND . 
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remember that disasters are the result of social environments, resource allocation, and the 
sustainability of livelihoods among the parties affected by hazards. 
Cases such as China or India also demonstrate that an individual or community's relative 
vulnerability to disaster is as much the result of people’s access to social and material resources 
as it is a function of how dominant power structures in society manipulate access to these goods. 
Such resources may include, but are not limited to: adequate health care, proper sanitation, 
communication and transport infrastructure, as well as education. On the macro level, the role of 
the national government in providing a supportive welfare system and the proper disaster 
mitigation measures is an essential component in determining the risk and vulnerability of any 
given community. Countries with a more developed infrastructure and welfare support system 
(such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, or Germany) have equipped their citizens with the 
resources necessary to diminish vulnerability to disasters, allowing for successful adaptation 
should a hazard strike. In less developed countries, however (like the Congo, Haiti, Guatemala, 
or Nepal), the state apparatus lacks the means to provide its citizens with this sort of security and 
support. As a consequence, their citizens of underdeveloped states are often forced to accept 
riskier livelihood conditions and face situations of greater vulnerability. 
 Therefore, the prominent correlation between the political and economic instabilities of 
LDCs and a population’s greater overall vulnerability to disasters can be attributed to 
inconsistencies of the state regarding resource provisions and upholding human rights. Divergent 
regional policies surrounding people’s access and entitlements to resources and social goods, 
many of which are influenced by global capitalism and the residual elements of colonial policies, 
inevitably mean that the effects of a severe drought will vary from relatively little impact in some 
areas to extreme suffering in others. Pockets of regional vulnerability are difficult to detect, 
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however, since such processes and conditions most significantly affect small and isolated 
communities.23 The complexity of natural disasters arising from such a situation inevitably 
means that in order to ensure the successful recovery and the future protection of affected 
communities, sectoral needs at the local, district, and national levels must be acknowledged by 
domestic as well as international actors and revised accordingly. This would allow for 
appropriate government agencies to address the needs of their citizens -- assuming that the state 
has resources to provide such infrastructure in the first place. The absence of such support 
mechanisms often produces slum dwellings, poor rule of law, and generally less respect for the 
state apparatus, as there is poor communication between citizens and government. Faltering 
governments often lead to societies of unsafe environmental conditions, corruption, excessive 
economic insecurity surrounding peoples’ livelihoods, and recurring outbreaks of violence or 
biological epidemics due to high levels of migration and environmental degradation.  
Unless one is capable of understanding the historically-embedded root causes and 
broader social patterns that precipitate economic inequality, unsafe living conditions, and 
poignant political marginalization, it will be impossible to effectively develop a means of 
addressing natural disasters in the twenty-first century. One must analyze not only disasters in 
general, but rather go a step further and dissect the underlying forces that make people and their 
environment vulnerable to such crises in the first place. Countries must work to identify and 
address the broad range of needs that their citizens demand on both a micro and macro level, 
while also enhancing communication and coordination between people and government to 
ensure needs are met. This must be done at the local, regional and national level, while also 
taking into account the poignant effects of globalization. Disasters cannot be artificially 
                                                
23 Jonathan Walter, World Disasters Report 2001 (Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies, 2001). Available at:  http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/WDR/21400_WDR2001.pdf  
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separated from the functionings of normal, everyday society, for such factors are inherent to the 
escalation of hazards into disasters. The risks and constraints placed upon an individual’s daily 
life expose how disasters are created by compounding the effects of a trigger event (the hazard) 
within the underlying vulnerabilities of a society, as they are produced through temporal, 
regional, and international spheres of influence. 
However, vulnerability is more than a concept to be identified with poverty. 
Impoverishment alone is not sufficient to generate the complex array of social, political, and 
economic conditions that precipitate vulnerability to disaster. Other factors deeply embedded 
within the political economy and ideological views of a community are actually the strongest 
determinants of vulnerability in any given community. While it is true that populations who 
suffer from poverty, resource depletion, and marginalization are generally more vulnerable and 
face greater risk to disasters, one cannot declare a direct causation between poverty and a 
people’s vulnerability. 
This contention is clearly illustrated by the status of favela communities throughout Rio 
de Janeiro. Favelados are indeed impoverished, yet their vulnerability is a product of their 
marginality and disenfranchisement rather than a direct lack of financial capital. In Rio de 
Janeiro, a multi-generational history of economic necessity has forced favela residents to 
construct shantytowns in the city’s treacherous slopes and hillsides. The history of Rio’s favelas 
date back to the 1940s when migrant workers from the northern regions of Brazil came to the 
city during an era of widespread industrialization.24 These workers provided the main source of 
labor to construct the city that exists today. However, due to housing shortages, workers were 
                                                
24 Julio Cesar Pino, “Sources on the History of Favelas in Rio de Janeiro,” Latin American Research Review (32)3 
(1997): 111-122. JSTOR. 
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forced to take residence in the hillsides of the city, building illegal settlements that the 
government was incapable of regulating.25 
To this day, the relationship between Rio’s favelas, which currently house approximately 
twenty-five percent of the city’s population (1.5 million people), and the municipal government 
is tenuous. Favelados still lack many of the legal entitlements of citizenship. As of July 2015, a 
total of 77,206 people have been forcibly removed from their homes since the government-led 
eviction initiative began in 2009.26 This comes after two decades of relatively secure land tenure 
for the Favelados, since the 1988 Constitution guarantees a squatter’s right to build housing on 
fallow land.27 The people’s forced displacement has exacerbated vulnerability to disaster 
amongst favela communities in multiple ways. First, displacement strips Favelados of the only 
assets they have been able to acquire: their homes. Second, displacement reinforces the status of 
favela residents as inferior citizens in the eyes of the municipal government.  
For generations Favelados have had little access to many of the goods and services which 
wealthier civilians, located in the city center, take for granted. Lack of proper sewage or drainage 
systems as well as inadequate access to healthcare and education are prominent indicators of the 
favela residents’ marginality and vulnerability to disasters. Each year, many people die in the 
mudslides which come with the heavy rains.28  Expanding deforestation at the edge of the 
Rohcina favelas has worsened this risk. Meanwhile, the government still lacks the capacity and 
                                                
25 Ibid. 
26 Catalytic Communities database available at: http://catcomm.org/favela-facts/  
27 See the Federal Constitution of 1988: Article 5, item XXIII which delineates the “social function of property” and 
Article 183 which explicitly states that “Someone who possesses as theirs an urban area up to 250 square meters for 
five years, uninterrupted and without opposition, using it for housing for them or their family, acquires it as their 
domain as long as the claimant is not the owner of another urban or rural property. Title and concession of use shall 
be given to a man or a woman, or both, independent of their civil state.” 
 
See also Article 9 of the City Statute. 
28 World Watch Institute, Residents of Rio's Favelas Face Diverse Risks (Washington D.C.: World Watch Institute, 
2016). Available at:  http://www.worldwatch.org/node/4756 . 
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motivation to remediate such conditions. For decades there has been relative silence within 
political discourse regarding the issues surrounding favela communities, the least of which 
include racial and other types of social discrimination, merely reinforcing the favelados’ 
widespread exclusion from citizenship.29 Favela communities’ living conditions and socio-
economic situation are the result of life decisions made due to the constraints placed upon them 
by both cultural and historic forces; their vulnerability, and the daily risks they face, are 
primarily generated by how power and resources are withheld or distributed throughout society. 
Such may be through traditional practices of entitlement, government-imposed restrictions to 
individual access, or through kinship networks within the community.30 All of these factors, it 
must be noted, are not stagnant and are subject to constant change, adaptation, or revision, like 
all components of culture and civil society. As such, globalization has altered the nature of 
resource allocation and traditional patterns of human interaction, and especially in the face of 
political turmoil, economic downturns or hazard events, Favelado’s access to the resources and 
services they need are increasingly unpredictable. 
The favela dwellings of Rio, nearly all of which lack sanitation systems, have only grown 
over the decades. Residents have put generations-worth of income and physical labor into the 
construction and consolidation of their homes which are built upon areas of high-environmental 
risk to mudslides and earthquakes. Common views surrounding the existence of favela dwellings 
in Rio hinge upon the notion of a “culture of poverty”, whereby these (predominantly Afro-
Brazilian) individuals are seen as obstacles to their own progress by the state and upper classes 
                                                
29 Brodwyn Fischer, Cities From Scratch: Poverty and Informality in Urban Latin America (London: Duke 
University Press, 2014), 9-30. 
30 Piers M. Blaikie, Ben Wisner, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, 
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of society.31 The rampant presence of drug trafficking and violent gangs in the favelas has only 
reinforced such social perceptions. As a result, police continue to have a large presence in the 
region, seeking to dismantle rampant networks of organized crime by enforcing government-led 
pacification programs. However, the abuse of police authority and an enduring history of 
political isolation has reinforced a strong lack of trust between favela residents and government.  
The historically-embedded social relations and power structures which exist between 
Favelados and the government of Rio thus determines the vulnerability of these marginal 
communities. Such is manifest through the favela population's limited access to social capital 
and resources, as well as their exclusion from political activity.  Simultaneously, Favelado’s 
vulnerability to disaster is embedded within how the wealthier communities of Rio perceive 
favela residences. Not only are favela communities highly vulnerable to disasters from triggers 
such as earthquakes, floods, or landslides, but these populations also have minimal capacity to 
effectively recover and adapt. In the face of a disaster, the little land inhabited by these informal 
residents loses all productive value, their homes are destroyed and many lives are lost. Yet, 
without proper sanitation, health care, nutrition, nor sufficient government support in the 
aftermath, many more people will become ridden with disease, physically displaced, and perish. 
The Favelado’s history of interaction with government has made their relationship with 
municipal officials only more strained over time, for a belligerent government and lack of legal 
protection to rights of citizenship have left Rio’s Favelados extremely vulnerable indeed. Their 
needs are repeatedly overlooked or misaddressed by government-funded development programs, 
while little is done to improve economic security for these communities.  The result is a vicious 
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cycle of increasing vulnerability rooted in political marginality, lack of economic opportunity, 
and deeply-embedded cultural biases. 
To accurately analyze the underlying causes of natural disasters and develop effective 
modes of crisis prevention are more pressing issues in the twenty-first century than ever before. 
The frequency and cost of natural disasters is rising globally, most especially in developing 
countries where the most severe effects of climate change are felt. Media outlets, politicians, as 
well as social and scientific scholars have highlighted the poignant concerns which climate 
change is coming to play in shaping the world we live in. As this discussion contends, while 
climate change is indeed a strong force impacting the severity of contemporary catastrophes, it is 
not directly responsible for the exorbitant cost of the damage and suffering incurred, both 
financially and in terms of human life. Rather, the true determinants of disasters lie within the 
power systems at play in any given society when these regions come into contact with a 
triggering hazard event. The media often portrays the suffering of vulnerable communities 
during a disaster to be the result of natural processes and climate change: that nature has become 
an existential threat to mankind and the cause of human suffering. The dominant argument here 
is that disasters are to be attributed to natural causes, and can therefore be explained in terms of 
exceptional environmental events, not of continuing and normal social processes.32 However, 
this view overlooks some of the most critical root causes and dynamic socio-political pressures 
that create disasters. 
                                                
32 See the work of Gini and De Castro as well as Kenneth Hewitt for more information on this topic.  
Kenneth Hewett, Interpretations of Calamity from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 
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In fact, disasters are directly attributable to different forms of interaction between distinct 
populations, state governments, and the environment. These modes of interaction may be broken 
down into three basic categories: the degree to which a rights culture exists in civil society and is 
upheld by government, the developmental capacity of the state to address the needs and demands 
of its citizens, and finally the degree to which the environment and natural resources have been 
disrupted as a result of manipulation by political and economic agents. The strengths or 
weaknesses of the state along any one of these three elements alters the vulnerability of civilians 
to natural disasters by changing people’s capacity to cope with adverse weather conditions, as 
well as by determining environmental resilience to severe hazards. In a weak, underdeveloped 
state, disaster prevention and response units are either non-existent or ill equipped to address the 
needs and demands of citizens. Similarly, in regions with a poor history of upholding human 
rights, not only are many citizens forced to accept unsafe living conditions and insecure 
livelihoods, but people’s access to the resources necessary for effective adaptation are often 
withheld and coping mechanisms obstructed. Finally, under conditions where resource extraction 
and excessive industrial development have degraded the integrity of the natural environment to 
the point of severe instability, a hazard such as a monsoon or hurricane can create catastrophic 
flooding and landslides. Under the proper conditions, such events can easily escalate into a 
natural disaster. 
By utilizing these three frameworks of analysis, the following discussion will expose how 
the damage inflicted by natural disasters is not merely a product of severe weather, but is rather a 
manifestation of the pre-existing socio-political and economic structures that have generated 
unsafe conditions for the marginal and disenfranchised residents of such regions. The outbreak of 
disaster thus exposes the moment when these instabilities come into contact with an 
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environmental hazard. Historic processes of isolation, oppression, and exploitation, combined 
with contemporary international power systems, interact in complex ways to affect different 
socioeconomic classes distinctly. The result is to create vulnerability and scarcity among the 
most defenseless communities. These processes affect a society’s ideological orientation and 
their cultural norms, empowering some while isolating others. When the resulting dynamic 
pressures and root causes come into contact with a natural hazard, a disaster is likely to follow 
due to the high vulnerability of certain groups and their inability to adapt as conditions change.33  
This will be illustrated in detail by analyzing the experiences of disaster in Haiti, 
Ethiopia, and Nepal throughout the following chapters. By exploring the historic roots of Haitian 
vulnerability, it will be shown how the three aforementioned frameworks interact across regional 
and temporal spheres to generate distinct outcomes of vulnerability and unsafe conditions. By 
focusing attention on the current famine in Ethiopia, this analysis will highlight the role of 
international actors, economic interests and repressive regimes in generating disaster outcomes 
from recurring environmental hazards such as a prolonged drought. Finally, in the case study of 
Nepal, the tensions between these frameworks will be further addressed within the framework of 
political economy, illustrating the pivotal role of the state and other political agents in 
determining the exact manifestation of environmental disasters. 
Across the world, the risks faced by communities are becoming increasingly new and 
uncertain. Populations are migrating from rural to urban centers, while remittances and new 
components of the international political economy continue to alter the global allocation of 
resources. At the same time, contemporary geopolitical interactions are shifting the stability of 
populations everywhere. The current refugee crisis, conflicts currently underway in Central 
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Africa, as well as the migratory patterns of families across Latin America, provide only a few 
examples of how socio-political patterns combine with economic factors to help shape the 
vulnerability of both individuals and entire communities to natural disasters. In order to 
effectively address these debilitating crises, the international community must begin to take 
preventative, and not just reactive measures. Such will require that international institutions and 
governments alike address disasters as a function of the daily risks which people face that 
heighten their vulnerability. By understanding a population’s vulnerability to be a direct result of 
the social and political context in which a hazard event occurs, one cannot overlook the 
importance of factors such as class, ethnicity, or regional affiliations in determining the outcome 
of and international responses to such events. Rules and institutions must be able to adapt over 
time. By approaching contemporary disaster analysis through a holistic lense, accounting for the 
inextricable effects of social, political, and economic patterns within a community, the links 
between the risks people face and the reasons for their vulnerability to disasters will be exposed 
as deeply embedded within the broader patterns of social interaction. Only with such an 
understanding of how natural disasters arise can the international community effectively address 
one of the greatest threats to human security in the twenty-first century.  
 
 
Chapter Two: Assessing the Root Causes of Haiti’s Natural Disasters 
 
As this chapter was being written, Hurricane Matthew tore across Haiti, the death toll 
climbing from one hundred to well above four hundred victims in a single hour. However, its 
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island neighbor, the Dominican Republic, reported only four deaths.34 Haiti is known as the 
poorest nation in the Western hemisphere. Approximately 60% of the population lives in poverty 
and 25% in extreme poverty.35 Throughout history, Haiti has experienced some of the most 
severe natural disasters in the region while other Caribbean states have suffered very little in 
comparison. Such trends are a strong indication that there are many significant factors beyond 
environmental conditions which determine the manifestation of natural disasters within any 
given nation state. Haiti’s experiences of disasters, as will be illustrated in the following 
discussion, are highly dependent upon the outcomes of socio-political ideology, foreign 
influences, and economic conditions. Haiti’s past defines various elements of its current political, 
economic, and cultural identity, and these -- not environmental hazards -- are the true root causes 
of Haiti’s repeated experience of natural disasters. 
Natural disasters are directly attributable to the material aspects of Haiti’s condition. The 
daily recreation of Haitian vulnerability to natural disasters cannot be fully understood without a 
comprehensive analysis of the people’s history, local ecological interactions, as well as a detailed 
understanding of Haiti’s political economy. With these considerations in mind, the following 
chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of Haitian history. The purpose of this discussion is 
to expose how the state’s social, economic, and political experiences have destroyed the 
resilience of civil society against environmental stressors, while also eviscerating the stability of 
the natural environment. When these dynamic pressures and underlying patterns of oppression 
come together under the appropriate environmental triggers, crisis-level disasters are inevitable. 
                                                
34 “Hurricane Matthew: Haiti Storm Kills Hundreds,” BBC News, October 7, 2016. 
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35 The World Bank Group, Haiti Overview (Geneva: The World Bank Group, 2017). 
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At the center of Haiti’s excessive suffering lies the enduring prominence of structural 
violence: institutionalized processes of exploitation and marginalization rooted in the nation’s 
political and economic experiences. Structural violence in Haiti is a process of exclusion and 
exploitation that is exerted systematically upon the most marginalized and impoverished groups, 
being perpetrated by Haitian elites and foreign nation-states alike. Poverty, inequality, racism, 
and the endurance of patriarchal exploitation are all symptoms of such endemic structural 
violence. Examples of structural violence abound, whether one looks to the period of French 
colonization, US occupation, the successive Duvalier regimes, or to any of Haiti’s numerous 
kleptocratic military juntas. The institutionalization of corruption, violence, self-aggrandizement, 
and racism has become entrenched deep within Haiti’s political culture, and have only reinforced 
the dominance of degenerate social structures and the state’s overwhelming lack of political 
leadership across millennia. These patterns of interaction and exclusion simultaneously uphold 
the social machinery of oppression while reinforcing the de-socialization of a people from their 
rights as citizens and human beings.36  
For Haiti, the influences of structural violence have eviscerated any capacity for the 
government to enforce the rule of law or provide social goods to its impoverished, highly 
vulnerable population. In fact, it is often government officials themselves who actively destroy 
the legal institutions designed to protect civil society, thereby placing government actors and 
institutions at the center of the issue. The result has been a complete lack of political 
accountability, rampant human rights violations, and enduring economic insecurities. When 
combined with the severely destabilizing effects of global warming, as well as Haiti’s geographic 
location, natural disasters are imminent. To explore the historical roots of Haiti’s natural 
disasters requires that one acknowledge how the architects of this structural violence manipulate 
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tactics of de-socialization: erasing historical memory and consolidating resources to maintain the 
balance of power in their favor.37 Inevitably, this comes at the expense of the human dignity and 
security of those most oppressed and exploited.  
The root causes of structural violence in Haiti can be traced back to the era of French 
occupation. Between 1681 and 1789 over 450,000 African men and women were imported into 
colonial Haiti to support a plantation system sustained by a brutal slave labor regime.38 
Throughout the era, Haiti grew sugar cane, coffee, indigo, cotton, tobacco and many exotic 
spices which were in high demand throughout Europe and Asia. Among all the industries 
promoted by the French, none was more lucrative than sugar.39 It was not uncommon for slaves 
in Haiti to die before the age of twenty-five, it being cheaper for plantation owners to simply 
import new slaves from Africa and work their men to death than to maintain adequate living 
conditions in the slave quarters.40 The purpose of all colonial practices was thus to enrich the 
French empire irrespective of the human cost.  
Due to the excessive growth of the sugar industry in colonial Haiti, economic forms of 
production across the island shifted from traditional subsistence farming to plantation-based 
agricultural practices. The transformation in production methods enacted during this time 
precipitated a decline in crop variety and regional biodiversity, both of which made rural farmers 
highly vulnerable to famine should a disease or drought wipe out the season’s crops.41 These 
methods of production also destroyed the resilience of the natural environment against severe 
weather patterns.  
                                                
37 Ibid., 308-309. 
38 James Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1988), 2-3. 
39  Terry F. Buss and Adam Gardner, Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do 
About It (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 21. 
40 Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2006), 56. 
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Ever since the 17th century Haiti’s cash crop economy has infinitely magnified the 
nation’s environmental susceptibility to disasters. The expansion of plantation-based mono-
cropping during the colonial era undermined the stability of the natural environment to 
dangerous levels by damaging biodiversity.42 Plantation farming also led to rapid deforestation, 
which intensified when coffee was introduced in 1730. The expansion of export crops into 
Haiti’s forest, fallow lands, and terrain previously devoted to subsistence, caused many local 
plant varieties and gatherable food products to go extinct.43 As an ever-increasing amount of the 
country’s arable land was converted into cash crop plots to service European markets, many 
Haitian farmers lost their livelihood diversity (a common safeguard against famine). 
Simultaneously, deforestation and reduced biodiversity depleted the quality of soil, leading to 
erosion and mudslides from severe storms. Combined, these trends made both the environment 
and the people increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters.  
However, beyond the environmental consequences of colonialism in Haiti are the 
extremely important cultural impacts of French domination. Throughout the colonial era, 
France’s brutal plantations system exploited workers in ways which have scarred the habitus of 
Haitian politics and civil society to this day. As Paul Farmer noted,  
“Colonial realities … forever [marked] Haitian understanding of social process. Modern-
day Haitians are the descendants of kidnapped West Africans, and their collective 
identity today cannot be fathomed without an understanding of Saint-Domingue. Hailing 
from scores of tribes, speaking as many mutually unintelligible languages, the Africans of 
Saint-Domingue had nothing in common but their bondage and their hatred of their 
oppressors.”  
 
The disunity and cultural isolation of Haitian slaves was thereby instrumental to upholding the 
machinery of oppression in the colonial era. These conditions are also pivotal to understanding 
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the disenfranchisement, marginalization, and vulnerability faced by a majority of the population 
today. Under such conditions, colonialism condemned Haitians to work within a political 
economy of scarcity while also encouraging the persistence of dynamic racially-based 
hierarchies. Slavery, and the tyrannical mechanisms of plantation-based sugar economies 
introduced under the French, have fractured the organic unity of the nation, creating sharp 
divisions based on race and class. Within this system of discrimination and oppression blacks 
remain at the very bottom of the social hierarchy.  
In 1804, Haiti became the first nation in the Americas after the United States to gain its 
independence. Yet, even as a free republic, the cultural impacts of the colonial era endured. Haiti 
remained divided by the economic priorities of the wealthy mulattoes against the black masses. 
While the new elites insisted that the emerging peasantry produce lucrative commodity crops for 
the global marketplace, Haiti’s former slaves desired nothing more than to be left alone to 
produce for themselves and local markets.44 Almost immediately after independence, the elites 
took control and reinstated the plantation systems through contract labor.45  Thus, the inequalities 
of the colonial system were revived under a new regime of oppression. 
Throughout the 1800s, the pauperization and political marginalization of African Haitians 
continued en masse, exacerbating people’s vulnerability to environmental shocks inordinately. 
Haitian producers who were not part of the plantation regime did not fare much better, however, 
as most producers who were linked to the global marketplace did so through intermediaries.46 
Such a system resulted in the spatial isolation of the peasantry, not just from the outside world, 
but also from other classes within Haiti.47 This weakened the unity of the masses in the face of 
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impending elite domination while also denying the peasants agency over their own means of 
production. Time has done little to improve such conditions: the black majority of Haiti’s 
population are still entrenched deep within this a feudal system and the masses are still denied 
many of their basic rights. 
Today, Haiti’s barren mountains stand as a physical reminder of the exploitation the 
nation has faced over the years, and environmental resilience has only worsened. Immediately 
following independence, land remained unequally distributed amongst the elites of society. 
Peasants have been granted access exclusively to the marginal slopes above the fertile plains, yet 
far below the zones of coffee production.48 These soils are particularly susceptible to erosion 
when cleared for farming. However, with thousands of poor, displaced Haitians, such lands are 
the only areas to which families have access and control.49 The forced resettlement of many 
communities into the hillsides exposes not only their economically impoverished status, but also 
highlights their correspondingly marginal political agency.50 These conditions have meant that 
such communities lack access to many of the goods and services which would improve their 
resilience against environmental hazards or provide protection from the crisis-level storms that 
are now so prevalent.  
Unrestrained resource extraction and economic exploitation have plagued Haiti since the 
eighteenth century. Such processes have eviscerated the resilience of the environment against 
natural hazards and increased livelihood volatility amongst the poorest and most vulnerable 
demographics. As USAID reported in 2016,  
“Widespread deforestation, particularly in the hillsides, has led to flooding, dramatic rates 
of soil erosion, and subsequent declines in agricultural productivity. Haiti’s valuable 
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coastal and marine resources have been degraded by sediment deposition and overfishing, 
resulting in considerable loss in biodiversity”.51  
 
For Haiti, the decay of environmental quality from aggressive farming practices, in conjunction 
with a long history of colonial exploitation has led to the gradual, yet indisputable rise of socio-
economic insecurity and authoritarianism. These are both forces which heighten people’s 
vulnerability to disaster in complex and mutually reinforcing ways.  
Concerns regarding Haiti’s rapid environmental degradation have become increasingly 
worrisome since independence in 1804. Following the Haitian revolution, the government was 
forced to export timber throughout the 19th century to pay off a 150 million Franc indemnity to 
its former oppressor. This debt was justified by France as compensation for the losses incurred to 
plantation owners during Haiti’s war for independence, as the French elite were deprived of their 
primary source of wealth (their slaves and sugar plantations) after Haiti won its independence.52 
Meanwhile, Haiti attempted to maintain plantation-style production methods as a means of 
producing export crops. Yet, with the land destroyed after the civil war and wage labor payments 
making the endeavor less profitable, Haiti’s economy suffered substantially. This, combined with 
the outrageous demands which France forced upon Haiti, eviscerated any possibility for Haiti’s 
new government to develop the domestic infrastructure and welfare programs necessary to 
secure its vulnerable citizens against natural disasters.  
Furthermore, while French slave owners demanded payment of their reparations, the 
United States and other Western powers imposed a trade embargo against Haiti in an act of 
solidarity with the island nation’s former oppressor. In 1825, the United States even went so far 
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as to block Haiti’s invitation to the Western Hemisphere Panama Conference.53 This effectively 
placed the nation in a state of diplomatic quarantine. Under such circumstances, Haiti was not 
recognized as an independent nation by the international community until France acknowledged 
full payment of Haitian debt in 1893 -- almost ninety years after independence.54  
However, even during Haiti’s period of official ‘isolation’, the United States maintained a 
firm hold over all political and economic affairs within the state at the expense of the Haitian 
government. On numerous occasions U.S. marines would storm into the Banque Nationale 
d’Haiti and claim large sums of money supposedly owed to the United States.55 Various military 
historians have also recalled that, “The United States Navy [was] compelled to send warships 
into Haitian waters to protect the lives and property of American citizens.”56 This occurred in 
1849, 1851, 1857, 1858, 1865, every year from 1866 through 1869, 1876, 1888, 1891, 1892, and 
again each year between 1902 and 1915.57 The United States maintained ships in Haiti 
practically uninterrupted throughout the entire period of ‘isolation’. However, the aim of this 
unofficial US occupation was less to protect American lives or promote stability in Haiti, than it 
was to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Throughout the early twentieth century, the United States 
became increasingly strict in controlling Caribbean commercial traffic and access to the Panama 
Canal.58 Therefore, while ostracized, the new nation of Haiti was not ‘isolated’ as some would 
claim. Rather, the country was a much-used pariah, manipulated by the United States and 
European powers for economic or political gains.59 In a broader context, this history is indicative 
of the nature of power relations in the post-colonial era, whereby global hegemons have been 
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able to collectively alienate underdeveloped prior colonies, assuring the weaker states’ 
subservience to dominant political interests and sustained economic dependency. Since the 
colonial era, international power hierarchies have generated and reinforced excessive livelihood 
insecurities, transnational displacement, and greater overall vulnerability to natural disasters 
amongst the world’s most desperate and marginalized societies. 
As such, the cultural junctures and ideologies established by Haiti’s colonial social 
hierarchies are a central force behind the state’s repeated subjection to despotic regimes and 
enduring economic underdevelopment. The ideologies promoted throughout colonialism and into 
the era of US occupation have fostered the state’s tendency towards authoritarian militarism in 
numerous ways. Under the Haitian culture of political degeneracy, people’s rights have virtually 
no legal safeguards; thousands of individuals are thus left abjectly poor and oppressed by the 
elites and government alike. Deep livelihood insecurity and desperation for a sense of protected 
humanity against oppression are defining characteristics of the Haitian condition. Such factors 
are central to understanding Haiti’s incapacity to address or prevent natural disasters. It was also 
a combination of these sentiments which fueled the nationalist rhetoric espoused by those who 
supported tyrannical dictator, Francois Duvalier throughout his reign from 1957 to 1971.60  
In the post-independence era, the consequences of commodity crop production in Haiti 
have not been merely environmental, but also incorporate important socio-political and economic 
considerations. These secondary dimensions pose direct implications for determining people’s 
vulnerability to, and the likelihood of, disaster under hazardous weather conditions. Such is the 
case since growing cash crops like coffee or sugar inevitably constrain the production capacity of 
producers within the fluctuations of global markets, while also altering the ecological conditions 
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experienced locally.61 Throughout the 1900s, the further expansion of monocrop agricultural 
practices for globalized trade was deeply established within the governing networks of the state, 
and large US agribusinesses played a central role in shifting agricultural production methods 
throughout the nation. Even today, USAID continues to implement modernized development 
projects such as Feed the Future or Climate-Resilient Farming, which come with many negative 
economic and environmental consequences for the same Haitians they claim to serve. 
In 1970, industrialized sweatshop production began after the United States invested 
heavily in the growth of assembly line manufacturing. Quickly, factory labor replaced coffee 
production as the number one source of income.62 With the subsequent modernization of industry 
and an exponentially increasing population, charcoal demand in the capital, Port-Au-Prince, 
increased substantially.63 This caused even greater deforestation across the country and 
accelerated the rate of environmental degradation -- something which was already a problem due 
to unsound commercial agricultural practices and ever-increasing competition over land.  
The twentieth century did not fare much better. As globalization furthered Haiti’s 
connections with international markets, industrialization expanded unrestrained. Further 
deforestation exacerbated tensions between neighboring populations, aggravated soil erosion, 
and prompted the global media to label Haiti as suffering from an enduring environmental crisis. 
Meanwhile, foreign direct investment, mostly from the United States, continued to pour into 
Haiti. Currently, the United States accounts for 85.3% of all Haitian exports.64  
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Since independence, the fate of Haiti has been intimately tied to US interests. In the 
1980s Haiti was a poor, over-crowded country, ruled by a U.S.-backed, right-wing regime that 
was highly supportive of increasing US assembly plants, called maquilas, across the state.65 By 
the end of 1980 Haiti became the world’s ninth largest assembler of goods for US 
consumption.66 Revenues from international outsourcing constituted over a quarter of the 
country’s annual foreign exchange receipts.67 US interference in the domestic affairs of Haiti has 
created some of the most dramatic and enduring forms of structural inefficiencies within the state 
apparatus, forcing Haiti to become even more susceptible to natural disasters. As Roger Burbach 
and Mark Herrold described, “Largely because of its cheap labor force, extensive government 
repression, and denial of even minimal labor rights, Haiti is one of the most attractive countries 
for both the subcontractors and the maquilas.”68 During this period, Haitian exports to the US 
(which consisted mostly of nuts and fruit) increased by a mere 3500%, indicating the rising 
levels of Haitian dependence upon its imposing American neighbor.69 US interference in Haiti 
thus altered the political and economic agency of local farmers to an increasingly marginal 
status, forcing their subservience to the demands of Yankee imperialism. Simultaneously, 
economic intervention caused irreparable damage to the environment and integrity of social 
unity. Repeatedly, the US has intervened in Haiti to extract what little economic gains the nation 
can provide, exploiting local Haitian farmers and the environment in the interests of large 
multinational corporations. Seeking to assuage these conditions, ignorant environmental 
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conservation programs and inefficient foreign aid initiatives have flooded into Haiti. Yet, this has 
only worsened the people’s dependency and endemic vulnerability.  
Over time, in response to dynamic political constraints or economic desperation, some 
Haitians have attempted to lease and sharecrop their fields. However, since there remains 
virtually no space for traditional fallowing practices in such rugged terrain, soil quality has 
further deteriorated.70 Likewise, poor economic conditions combined with the human tendency 
toward risk adversity have dis-incentivized capital investment for fertilizers on these leased 
lands.71 While the sharecropping system is still practiced in many regions of rural Haiti, 
agricultural output remains at levels only sufficient for basic subsistence plus the sale of a minor 
surplus in local markets.72 To this day, free market capitalism and neoliberal policies continue to 
heighten Haitians’ vulnerability. Haiti’s current economic policies tend to favor the urban over 
the rural sector, appeasing US interests while directly harming the income security of rural 
communities.73 For the average Haitian farmer, the possibility of getting a loan is minimal. Even 
when an individual is fortunate enough to find a lender, the interest rates are so high that he must 
relinquish almost all of his profits, or in some cases, face insolvency.74 Furthermore, small 
landholdings combined with the high cost of borrowing effectively destroy the growth capacity 
of rural farming communities, condemning rural farmers to produce foods exclusively for the 
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local market and domestic consumption.75 To grow agricultural products on the scale necessary 
for export is too costly for the Haitian peasant. Beyond this, soil erosion and rampant 
deforestation have destroyed valuable, arable land beyond repair, worsening the level of 
economic uncertainty faced by rural peasants.76 The aforementioned conditions, combined with 
an ever-increasing population, bring about widespread unemployment across Haiti and present 
significant, yet not entirely understood cultural, political, and environmental consequences for 
the security of the nation. Endemic marginalization and pauperization of the Haitian populace 
has forced a majority of people into risky and unpredictable living situations along Haiti’s barren 
hillsides. 
The consequences of these trends are made most explicit by the outcome of Hurricane 
Jeanne in September 2004. As the storm tore through the nation, approximately 3,000 Haitians 
were left dead, while in the Dominican Republic, the death toll was in the single digits.77 Various 
reports have noted that a majority of the casualties in Haiti were caused by massive landslides, as 
vast amounts of water fell along the eroded hills. The storm destroyed soil cover and swept 
through entire communities in a violent “wave of destruction”.78 The devastation suffered by the 
delicate landscape completely shattered the homes and all material assets of its residents, while 
in the aftermath many people remained isolated from much needed aid and medical care due to 
lack of infrastructure. The government’s complete incapacity to address the needs of society 
under such dire conditions meant that many Haitians later perished from disease, malnutrition, 
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and poor sanitation.79 Sadly, Hurricane Jeanne is just one instance among many which exposes 
how the Haitian people’s forced migration into the barren mountains has obliged them to accept 
everyday situations of greater risk and insecurity to natural disasters.  
Collectively, the outcomes of such a history have ensured that the Haitian state is to 
remain powerless and incapable of providing for its people. According to Transparency 
International’s 2015 report, Haiti ranks 158/168 on the corruption perceptions index.80 The 
nation is also one of the most poverty-stricken in the world. To this day, the government lacks 
the capacity to strengthen infrastructure, mitigate violent crime, improve access to health care, 
and even to provide basic public goods such as proper roadways and adequate sanitation. 
According to the UN Human Development Report of 2011, “The poorest 30% of the population 
has access to less than 6% of the country’s income [...] the richest 2% of Haiti’s people control 
26% of national wealth.” 81 Since the report was published, the situation in Haiti has only 
worsened. Haitians’ vulnerability to disasters and disease epidemics is expected to increase as 
global warming and rising sea levels in the Caribbean region worsen, as the urban population 
proceeds to grow exponentially, and as the nation continues to suffer debilitating material and 
social conditions. Together, such processes have amplified inequality and rates of natural 
resource extraction in Haiti. These factors are the dynamic result of colonially-driven 
environmental destruction combined with the exploitative mechanisms of a neoliberal world 
order. Never have the perpetrators of this structural violence considered the consequences of 
their actions for the local populations most directly affected. The masses are effectively excluded 
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from the political and economic life of their society, giving rise to poignant vulnerability to 
natural disaster.  
Migration, both domestic and international, has also been pivotal to creating Haitians’ 
vulnerability to disaster. With the increased strains of rural life under the governments of the 
19th and 20th centuries, many rural families left their villages behind in search of higher paying 
work in Port-Au-Prince or the Dominican Republic. To this day, the vast majority of the 
Dominican Republic’s migrant Haitian laborers are part of the informal economy: undocumented 
and illegal residents, moving from job to job in search of employment and evading detention or 
deportation by Dominican authorities.82 In these instances, not only are Haitian laborers left 
without the guarantees of citizenship while in the Dominican Republic, but they are also forced 
into unsafe and unregulated working conditions that magnify their vulnerability to natural 
disasters in numerous ways. Under the proper environmental circumstances, a natural disaster is 
the certain outcome of the political and social conditions that these migrant workers have 
accepted out of pure economic desperation. 
Domestic patterns of urban migration also leave many individuals at greater risk and 
vulnerability to disasters. This is most notably done by increasing people’s susceptibility to 
disease epidemics such as HIV/AIDs and by placing greater strains on the local administration to 
accommodate such a massive influx of individuals.83 When a severe storm hits Haiti, the people 
are physically vulnerable and the state under great stress, lacking roads, communication 
infrastructure, and even proper urban sanitation or waste removal systems. 84 Combined, such 
circumstances mean the outbreak of natural disaster is inevitable. Urbanization has also fractured 
                                                
82 Barbara L. Bernier, “Sugar Cane Slavery: Bateyes in the Dominican Republic,” New England Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, (9)1 (2003): 16. 
83 Michel S. Laguerre, "Migration and Urbanization in Haiti," Sociologus, Neue Folge/New Series, (37) 2 (1987): 
118-39. 
84 Paul Farmer, "An Anthropology of Structural Violence," Current Anthropology, (45)3 (2004): 305-325. 
 
 
 
43 
community ties within rural locations, as younger populations leave in search of work, and as 
men depart from their families to improve economic opportunities by sending remittances 
home.85 Out of financial necessity, many women also resort to prostitution to supplement their 
income, placing themselves and their families at greater risk to violence, displacement, and 
disease epidemics.86   
Irrespective of the risks, urbanization has increased significantly in the 21st century, and 
the state continues to face rising pressures in order to accommodate the influx of new residents. 
Massive shantytown settlements proliferate, and this urban chaos only worsens the effects of a 
natural hazard, especially since a majority of Haiti’s housing remains undocumented by federal 
agencies.87 Squatter settlements often lack sewage systems and proper drainage, basic 
infrastructure, safety standards, and electricity, sprawling for miles in nearly all directions. Even 
now, the government has yet to construct federally maintained roads or telecommunications.88  
Meanwhile, deforestation and erosion continue on a massive scale in rural regions. Thus, across 
the state, Haiti’s natural environment continues to deteriorate alongside the people’s resilience to 
hazards.  
Family ties and the unity of kinship systems have suffered from urbanization in Haiti as 
well, and this limits people’s access to valuable knowledge and coping mechanisms. Kinship ties 
and strong social capital are central components in determining a people’s vulnerability to, and 
the likelihood of, a disaster outbreak. As the World Disasters Report explains, an important 
element of early hurricane warning systems in the Caribbean are the local organizations and 
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networks of awareness that come “from below”.89 Such knowledge previously provided rural 
communities with important tools and networks to cope with hazards. Traditional systems of 
self-help and social protection at the neighborhood level, as well as training of local activists in 
rural areas, are pivotal to the survival of high-risk communities in the face of environmental 
hazards. Valuable kinship networks of reciprocity, as well as a sense of belonging to a 
community, have gradually eroded within many Haitian villages due to urbanization. Such 
factors, however, are essential to ensuring the stability and security of marginalized 
demographics not only in Haiti, but across the globe. 
Therefore, the social and cultural degeneration of Haiti is in many regards a symptom of 
the country’s emergence into the international sphere. With the rise of globalization and the 
hegemony of neoliberal ideology, the Haitian economy has become part of a new hierarchic 
chain of exploitation -- within which Haiti again lies at the bottom.90 Participation in the world’s 
capitalist system has reinforced patterns of extreme inequality between the regional cores and 
peripheries of economic interaction. Such trends effectively condemn Haiti to a state of unerring 
danger to violent outbreak due to uncontrollable social polarization and inequality. By 
eradicating traditional resource systems and dismantling prior resource allocation patterns 
between man and nature, Haitian citizens have lost the valuable knowledge base which 
traditionally provided communities with early warning mechanisms and ways to physically cope 
with environmental hazards. Furthermore, the modern era has seen Haiti forced into a new 
system of exploitation whereby the nation is defined as a ‘failed state’ of unerring dependence 
upon foreign actors and aid for economic survival. When a hazard strikes, these dynamic 
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pressures and instabilities are compounded to the breaking point, marking the outbreak of 
disaster.  
Haiti’s political system and economic structure present serious implications for the 
vulnerability and coping capacity of various social groups against natural hazards. The outcomes 
of policies enacted under US-sponsored dictator, Jean-Claude, ‘Baby Doc’, Duvalier are perhaps 
the most apparent illustration of this point. During Duvalier's fifteen years in power, tariffs for 
US goods were virtually eliminated, and domestic rice producers were swamped with imports 
from American farming operations.91 This stripped small Haitian producers of their primary 
source of income and sent hundreds of thousands of bankrupted farmers into the slums of Port-
au-Prince or abroad looking for work.92 In exchange for such amenable trade policies, the United 
States protected the Duvalier regime against peasant uprisings.93 Duvalier’s policies not only 
caused widespread displacement, leaving thousands homeless and politically isolated, but also 
generated enduring socio-economic instability and vulnerability among the urban and rural poor 
alike.  
This was especially the case for women. Being the predominant demographic of the 
agricultural workforce, women lost access to markets for the cash crops they had grown.94 
Meanwhile, their families survived on meagre levels of food, since their production of 
subsistence goods had been reduced in order to grow more profitable crops for export.95 What is 
more, a woman's agricultural plot was oftentimes not even formally acknowledged by the state as 
a site of economic production, since the land was documented under her husband’s name, he 
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being the formal proprietor under patriarchal norms.96 As a result, women were more vulnerable 
than men to the shifts in economic policies under Duvalier. US imperialism created a situation 
that further entrenched patriarchal exclusion: not only did women suffer from the loss of 
resources, capital, and livelihood security, but they were also overlooked by the state as a 
productive element of national output. The women who became displaced under the Duvalier 
regime were left with no choice but to go in search of better employment opportunities in the 
cities. Often times, they became victims of Latin America’s lucrative human trafficking rings.97 
In this sense, the consequences of economic openness and free market capitalism in Haiti are 
twofold: the further destruction of environmental resources, combined with the displacement and 
rising insecurity of millions of individuals.  
The legacy of Duvalier has only aggravated the country’s perpetual political instability. 
Haiti’s succeeding Western-imposed dictators have continued Duvalier’s legacy by regularly 
employing violence, corruption, and coercion as a means of maintaining power over all lucrative 
resources. The repeated imposition of corrupt and violent dictators (all of whom have been 
backed by the US) has further entrenched domestic inequalities and socio-political tensions 
across Haiti. 
Therefore, one must view the current humanitarian crisis in Haiti, a central force behind 
the nation’s repeated experience of disasters, as a process deeply embedded within the patterns 
of violence and exploitation that plague the nation. The movement of resources and people from 
the countryside into urban and global markets, and the consequences of this commercialization 
for local populations, is central to understanding the deforestation and degradation occurring 
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locally. This is a system of extraction which magnifies Haitians’ vulnerability to environmental 
disasters exponentially. It also undermines the agency of Haitian producers over their own labor. 
Haiti’s complex history highlights the role of foreign political entities and capitalist ideology in 
augmenting the degeneration of traditional knowledge systems, government agency, and 
environmental relations amongst local populations. Such conditions cause heightened livelihood 
insecurity among the landless and marginalized masses, and subsequently, engender greater 
vulnerability to disaster nationwide. As the case of Haiti indicates, a confluence of dynamic 
forces: colonialism, neo-imperialism, environmental degradation (aggravated an enduring legacy 
of exploitation, political corruption, and militant dictatorships) often generate social and 
economic conditions of deep insecurity.  
These concepts illustrate the highly political and economic dimensions of environmental 
narratives in Haiti and overturn conventional ideas regarding the region's environmental crisis. 
Common discourse portrays the Haitian condition as the inevitable outcome of natural forces and 
of the state’s backwards, inefficient government. However, this mainstream narrative is flawed, 
as it disregards the root causes of Haitians’ vulnerability. Indeed, when floods or hurricanes hit 
the region, the resulting environmental destruction is quite substantial. However, this damage is 
not merely due to the storm alone. Rather, it the product of over a century of insensitive political 
and economic processes which have stripped the land of its biological integrity, robbed the 
people of their livelihood security, and eradicated culturally-shared coping mechanisms. From 
this standpoint, the root causes behind Haiti’s inordinate experiences of natural disasters become 
quite clear.  
With the destruction of the environment and loss of biodiversity that has occurred since 
the 18th century, the basis of Haitian livelihoods has become increasingly vulnerable to shocks 
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from dynamic political, social, and economic forces. In reference to the recent 2012 earthquake, 
the state was labeled by NBC news as a "victim" of one of the “deadliest natural disasters” in 
history.98 However, nature does not simply take advantage of humankind in such a malicious 
way; other factors, of an entirely anthropogenic origin, are equally to blame for Haiti’s suffering 
from one of the “deadliest natural disasters” in history.99 It is the outcome of multiple factors 
compounded in a single instant: severe natural hazards as well as the dynamic pressures of 
political and economic insecurities, which actually cause the disasters so often highlighted by 
media publications. Only when these elements (of both natural and human origin) are combined 
can a natural disaster truly take hold. 
Therefore, understanding Haiti’s experience of natural disasters must be viewed from a 
framework of political ecology. That is, the traditional relationships which people have with their 
natural environment, in many ways defines their resilience against, and capacity to adapt under, 
stressful environmental conditions. When external or state political entities impose land 
restrictions and enact new policies which do not account for traditional forms of resource use (as 
was the case under both French and later US occupation) the livelihood of these communities 
become threatened in dramatic ways. Such trends constrain the people’s adaptive capacity 
against environmental stressors and diminish their physical security in everyday life. For Haiti, 
the first steps towards stripping rural farming communities of their ability to cope with adversity 
and sustain themselves began with colonial occupation. Yet, these harmful processes have 
endured in the modern era too, being marked by Haiti’s peripheral economic status and severe 
state of dependency. Resource-importing countries like the United States and dogmatic structural 
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adjustment policies only further constrict the state’s ability to realize a sense of economic 
empowerment -- something which would ultimately enhance people’s resilience against natural 
disasters. 
Additionally, the impact of international political systems and Western interests upon 
Haiti’s faltering government dictate the gendered allocation of resources, access to capital, and 
people’s overall vulnerability across the region. Beyond the role of economic ideology on the 
micro level, foreign demands and aid conditionalities reinforce a system of dependence in order 
for Haiti to achieve economic acceptance on the global stage.100 Even the most well-intentioned 
forms of foreign assistance in Haiti will often heighten the insecurity and vulnerability of at-risk 
communities rather than help. 
No event is a better manifestation of this phenomenon than the earthquake of January 12, 
2010, which killed more than 220,000 people and nearly demolished Port-Au-Prince. Many 
would agree that this disaster was predicated upon the dismal social, political, and economic 
conditions rooted in Haiti’s history. However, the nation’s recovery from this catastrophe 
highlights its critical state of dependence upon foreign powers, international finance regimes, and 
philanthropic assistance in order to survive.101 Following the quake, Haiti received over $10 
billion in aid, and UN peacekeepers were sent to the region to support the recovery process.102 
However, later that same year one of the worst recorded cholera outbreaks took hold of Haiti, an 
island which until that time had no history of cholera. Later analyses found that UN 
peacekeepers were likely carriers of the disease and had brought cholera to Haiti from prior 
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deployment to Nepal.103 To date, over 470,000 cases of cholera have been reported in Haiti, and 
approximately 6,631 deaths may be attributed to this single outbreak -- all due to the negligence 
of the international community.104  
It has been six years since the quake took place. The immediate effects of the disaster 
have long since passed, yet NGOs and various humanitarian aid agencies are still delivering free 
rice to Haiti, harming the country’s economy years after the emergency has subsided. Such aid is 
counterproductive to the realization of economic growth and improved civil resilience against 
disasters, for it shatters the demand for locally-produced items. Therefore, excessive aid impairs 
domestic market functions, and in turn endangers the livelihoods of the very same Haitian 
communities that international aid groups are trying so desperately to assist. In such conditions, 
the likelihood of repeated disaster outbreaks is infinitely magnified.  
What is more, the popularized forms of NGO charity which saturate Haiti’s economic 
structure (all of which are dominated by Western institutions) reinforce a mentality of 
dependency upon handouts, rather than encourage rapid recovery and economic empowerment 
within the communities affected by natural disasters. In Haiti, foreign aid has become an industry 
in itself, and this industry has eviscerated the demand for domestically produced goods and 
services. With the compounded effects of globalization and neoliberal hegemony continuing to 
attack the stability of this small state, it is likely that the government will remain incapable of 
realizing the long-term self-sufficiency needed to effectively prevent, address, and recover from 
disasters. The prolonged reliance of Haiti, like many developing nations, upon foreign aid 
disbursements has thus prevented the government from achieving the level of economic 
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development necessary to adequately support and protect its citizens from disaster. Aid has 
replaced the foreign direct investment and trade revenues which would sustain a developing 
economy, instead inhibiting growth by exacerbating the state’s reliance upon aid and foreign 
loans. As previously noted, this ultimately harms the resilience of local populations against 
disasters by limiting people’s access to goods and resources as well as by constricting the 
diversity of income opportunities available. 
With a firm understanding of Haiti’s socio-political history sufficiently established, it is 
also useful to compare experiences of disasters in Haiti to those of neighboring nation-states. 
Such a comparison further illustrates the highly political, cultural, and economic underpinnings 
of natural disasters. In the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s neighbor on the island of Hispaniola, 
demographic statistics expose the truly dire and highly vulnerable status of Haitian citizens. 
According to the World Factbook, both nations have nearly identical populations, yet Haiti has 
half the territory of the Dominican Republic. When analyzing basic indicators for general health 
and sanitation levels, Haiti also falls far behind that of its neighbor. In 2012, deaths related to 
HIV/AIDS in Haiti totaled 7,900 people, while in the Dominican Republic approximately 1,900 
deaths were recorded.105 A comparison of these two nations in the context of a biological hazard 
like HIV/AIDS provides a strong indicator of how state institutions and the socio-economic 
conditions of the government generate specific levels of civil vulnerability. With a high degree 
of migration between the two bordering nations, the spread of disease is not only fast, but also a 
serious concern for both governments. However, the divergence between each respective 
government’s ability to address the issue is quite staggering. Prior to the earthquake in January 
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2010, 46% of Haitians did not have access to healthcare.106 Simultaneously, the Dominican 
Republic was working to obtain universal access to healthcare for its citizens. Since this time the 
Dominican Republic has become known as having one of the best healthcare systems in the 
Caribbean.107 These facts illustrate an important dissimilarity between Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic regarding each government's institutional capacity to address the needs of their citizens. 
It also poses direct implications for people’s overall vulnerability to disasters as well as for the 
nation’s capacity to recover from such crises.  
Likewise, by comparing the relative ability of Cuba versus Haiti to recover from 
hurricanes in recent years, the political and economic factors which generate distinct 
demographic vulnerabilities to natural disasters are more apparently exposed. Both nations are 
equally at risk to hurricanes, being island nations of close geographic proximity in the Caribbean. 
For both states the recurrence of extreme weather from climate change has only increased in the 
twenty-first century. This poses new challenges to the existing governments, both in terms of 
preemptive measures against disasters and in the recovery process. However, the compounded 
effects of climate change, as well as each nation’s distinct political history, alter many of the 
factors which determine how affected communities will be able to recover and adapt when 
hazards strike. To better understand this notion, it is useful once more to refer to the Human 
Development Index referred to in Chapter One. On the HDI scale, Cuba currently scores .769 
while Haiti scores .483, ranking 67th and 163rd respectively.108 The stark differences between 
Cuba and Haiti’s levels of development according to the HDI (especially regarding each 
                                                
106 The World Health Organization, Haitian health care: a follow-up (Geneva: The World Health Organization, 
2011). Available at: http://www.who.int/features/2011/haiti/en/ . 
107  Ibid. 
108 United Nations Development Program, Haiti (2016). Accessed on 16 September, 2016. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/HTI 
Ibid. 
 
 
 
53 
government’s ability to provide adequate education, infrastructure, and social services to their 
citizens) highlights the poignant contrast in civilian vulnerability to disaster resulting from each 
country’s political institutions and state-led social welfare provisions -- or lack thereof.  
Specifically in the case of Cuba and Haiti, several factors have been found to strongly 
influence each state’s capacity to recover from disaster. In a study conducted by Pichler and 
Striessnig, higher levels of general education and training-enhanced social networks in Cuba, 
factors which created a social culture of support and reciprocity, were of great importance in 
augmenting local forms of resilience to disasters and reducing vulnerability.109 Such is the case 
since, as noted in the study, “Education predisposes popular understanding and action, making it 
a vital link in the early warning chain that makes the difference between life and death in the face 
of some of the planet’s most ferocious storms”.110 Since the beginning of Cuba’s Socialist 
Revolution in 1959, the clear commitment of the Cuban government to developing a legal 
framework for disaster management, as well as implementing universal education and health 
care systems, has meant that the public is comparatively better prepared to adapt to hazards and 
overcome risk than the powerless citizens of Haiti. 
In 2005, Hurricane Georges hit both Haiti and Cuba, and the effects of the storm upon 
each nation individually are indeed quite different. Irrespective of the fact that the storm was 
weakened by the time it reached Haiti, the impact was overwhelming. Many people lost their 
homes and livelihoods due to heavy mudslides along the deforested hillsides and mountains, 
leaving approximately 167,322 individuals homeless and without any access to clean drinking 
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water.111 In total 209 Haitians perished as a result of the 2005 hurricane.112 Contrastingly, in 
Cuba, a well-executed evacuation plan and state-directed warning system limited the death toll to 
only six individuals, while superior medical institutions insured a speedy recovery.113 Thus it 
becomes apparent that, relative to other nations, the Haitian government significantly lacks the 
institutional capacity required to address the needs of its citizens and protect against natural 
disasters, especially in terms of education, infrastructure, and healthcare provisions.  
The historical overview presented in this chapter has exposed the apparent role of 
political forces in generating the risks and vulnerabilities of certain populations to disaster. By 
analyzing the outcomes of Haiti’s exploitative institutions over time, it has also become evident 
that Haiti’s environmental conditions are in many ways the outcome of distinct political, 
economic, and cultural practices. The nation has suffered from repeated forms of structural 
violence and dependency: colonialism, imperialism, and later foreign aid efforts have each 
played a significant role in generating a culture of poverty and lack of security surrounding basic 
human rights. A government endowed with the financial and political resources necessary to 
provide its citizens with proper goods and services, especially early-warning mechanisms and 
emergency response units, significantly diminishes its citizen’s vulnerability to natural disasters. 
Such is done by enhancing people’s overall capacity to adapt and respond appropriately in 
adverse conditions. However, in Haiti this has not been the case. Instead, the nation has 
experienced a long history of colonial occupation and economic exploitation that has negatively 
impacted the nature of power relations within the state. Combined with the destabilizing effects 
of globalization, this history has led to greater inequality, poverty, and marginality amongst the 
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majority of Haitian citizens. The state’s enduring incapacity to uphold human rights, as well as 
its perpetually handicapped economy, have only exacerbated people’s insecurities while 
simultaneously destroying environmental resilience to severe weather. With the aforementioned 
considerations in mind, it becomes apparent that in Haiti, the outbreak of disaster is intimately 
linked to the legacies of colonialism and the exploitative mechanisms of dependency relations 
embedded within the current international system. 
 
Chapter 3: Addressing the Root Causes of Famine in Ethiopia 
 
 Upon examining Ethiopia’s recurring experiences of famine, it is tempting to 
relate the cause of these natural disasters to the most visible characteristics. These include: the 
country’s dependence upon traditional agriculture and pastoral farming, recurring droughts, rapid 
population growth, and agricultural market dysfunctions. However, to accept such a rationale 
would be to overlook the most important component in understanding how natural disasters, 
especially famines, develop into recurring crises. Ethiopia’s enduring history of human rights 
abuses and inter-ethnic violence, accentuated by an unaccountable, self-interested government, 
are among the most important, yet often overlooked factors which both create and prolong 
famine in the state.  
People’s vulnerability to natural disasters is indeed heightened when they are forced to 
cope with both poor environmental conditions and the defective governance of various regimes. 
Such circumstances have been instrumental to generating the unsafe conditions faced by a 
majority of the Ethiopia’s farming communities. This is the case whether government influence 
over people’s vulnerability manifests itself through policies of resource allocation, by limiting 
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public access to various goods and services, through civil-military relations, or within the nature 
of contemporary trade policies and economic goals. In Ethiopia, history exposes that when the 
underlying political structures of society are impounded by rapid population growth, 
environmental degradation, and a citizenry deeply dependent upon agriculturally-based 
livelihoods, famines can easily become recurring crises. Thus, drought in Ethiopia is merely the 
catalyst of famine, whereby more complex and enduring power relations are what truly 
determine how people will either cope with drought or potentially how these hazards could 
escalate to disastrous famine conditions. With the aforementioned considerations in mind, the 
following discussion will analyze various elements of contemporary Ethiopian famines. Such 
will expose the central role which government actions and decisions, as well as cultural 
perceptions can play, not only in prolonging a famine, but also in directly generating the natural 
disaster itself. 
To begin, however, one must take into account the complex manner whereby power 
relations alter the distribution of assets and resources within society. This concept is instrumental 
to understanding the causal chain of events preceding famine, for it determines whether people 
will be forced into the unsafe and hazardous living arrangements that exacerbate vulnerability to 
natural disasters.114 The underlying socio-political processes inherent to a community directly 
affect the distribution of resources and assets across a region and are concerns which could mean 
life or death in times of drought.115 In Ethiopia, land and freedom movement are by far the two 
most valuable assets possessed by any individual. From the Oromo and Afar pastoral 
communities of the highlands, to the Amhara and Somali agriculturalists, land has always been 
pivotal to the survival of Ethiopia’s residents. Land provides the material basis for livelihood 
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security, while the people’s freedom of movement ensures access to markets for the sale of 
surplus goods, as well as to reserve grazing lands in times of drought.116 
In this case study, vulnerability to famine will be addressed through two prominent 
frameworks: the food availability decline (FAD) and food entitlements decline models (FED).117 
The former argues that disruption to food production below a certain level, being triggered by a 
natural hazard, is what causes famine. The latter focuses on how shifts in people’s ability to 
acquire food through a variety of means (whether this be personal production, trade, state 
provisioning, or otherwise) creates a decline in people’s purchasing power and precipitates the 
outbreak of famine.118 The FED approach provides an important means of understanding how 
relations of power have changed throughout Ethiopia’s various regimes, determining the 
distribution of assets and income across the rural regions most vulnerable to drought. Central to 
the arguments put forth in the following analysis is an understanding that any adequate 
explanation of famine requires that both root causes and underlying socio-political pressures be 
linked together in a causal chain of explanation. Doing so defines the various access and 
entitlement mechanisms which have given rise to Ethiopia’s numerous famines. One prominent 
example of why such a detailed distinction is necessary may be found in the famine of 1973-
1977. Many scholars have attributed this incident to a severe drought. However, such an 
assertion begs the question as to why, then there have been droughts without famine and famines 
without drought, something which will be addressed further in later discussion.119 
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Prior analyses have also exposed how livelihood insecurity figures centrally within the 
root causes of natural disasters like famine. Yet, livelihood insecurities are themselves 
determined by complex forces: seasonal fluctuations in weather patterns as well as important 
variations to political and economic conditions over extended periods of time. Each of these 
forces alters a population’s entitlements and access to vital resources in distinct ways. Social and 
political processes are thus pivotal to conceptualizing the dynamic pressures that precipitate 
famines in Ethiopia. While it is true that the recurrence of flood and drought can be anticipated 
with relative certainty, it is much more difficult to anticipate how changes to political or social 
relations may shock people’s ability to acquire different essential resources in times of scarcity. 
In Ethiopia, demographic trends can change quite rapidly, while other factors such as moral 
values and cultural knowledge change relatively little over time. Oftentimes, the impact of such 
fluctuations in one sphere of life, intensified by corresponding changes to environmental, 
economic, or political circumstances, can engender instability and unsafe conditions for those 
concerned. As a result, cyclical patterns of drought and flood in Ethiopia do not necessarily 
indicate the outbreak of famine. Rather, we must understand the significance of a flood or 
drought as it exists along a continuum of temporal events. Indeed, natural hazards are often the 
trigger of famine. However, the essential components of creating a disaster from a hazard are the 
social processes and economic conditions which mature over time and define the political 
context in which hazards erupt. In Ethiopia, there is perhaps no single factor which determines 
the orientation of socio-political relations to a greater degree than ethnicity. 
 Ethnic ties have continuously played a pivotal role in shaping the ideological 
preconceptions of Ethiopia’s political economy, and in turn, upon the outbreak of famine. Across 
the country there are over eighty different ethnic groups, and while some represent over a million 
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individuals, others represent fewer than ten thousand.120 The result is a system of highly 
fragmented political representation. Sometimes these divisions even become so entrenched in 
ethnic concerns that it is difficult to distinguish between identity and ideology.121 The dominant 
ethnic minority of Tigray, who make up approximately 6% of the population, currently maintain 
autocratic control over the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
government. Meanwhile, the two largest ethnic denominations, the Oromo and Amhara, 
representing 34% and 27% respectively, continue to be persecuted by the ruling elites.122 
Increasingly, the Tigrayan-led government has used ethnicity as a basis for political 
organization; the Ethiopian state is ethnically divided into regional federations. Initially, the 
purpose of this federal system was to help the EPRDF government maintain control over the 
country’s myriad ethnic factions.123 However, these divisions, compounded by recent 
government policies that unequivocally marginalize the political demands of other ethnicities in 
Ethiopia, have exacerbated linguistic and cultural differences while also highlighting the 
confluence of competing historical narratives in Ethiopia. This makes for a volatile political 
environment indeed. In recent decades, ethnic mobilization against the tyranny of the Tigrayan 
government has increased, and the EPRDF has responded with swift, and increasingly violent, 
tactics of repression against such protest movements.124 
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In these instances, the ability for persecuted or marginalized communities to access 
resources, mobilize community support systems, and even to implement traditional coping 
mechanisms in times of environmental stress are substantially reduced. Since the most recent 
outbreak of protests in 2015, millions of the poorest, most vulnerable people in Ethiopia have 
been persecuted by police forces, systematically displaced, and once again face grave risk of 
starvation. In Ethiopia, as is the case more generally, the economic interests of the ruling 
minority are repeatedly promoted by the state at the expense of those most vulnerable to disaster. 
In such instances, state economic policies generate greater wealth amongst those in power and 
their bases of support, while forcing the pauperization of marginalized ethnic groups. In cases of 
drought in Ethiopia, there is often a strong correlation between the heightened exclusion of these 
communities from political and economic life and their susceptibility to famine. 
To further understand the intricacies of this correlation, a more detailed analysis of the 
links between people’s natural environment, cultural or political trends, and the outbreak of 
disaster is necessary. By deconstructing prior notions of what constitutes natural from 
anthropogenic events, desegregating people’s agency over reality, it becomes evident that the 
conditions whereby ‘exceptional’ natural events trigger full-blown disasters are less clear than 
once thought.125 Famines are a manifestation of the distresses induced by drought, combined 
with the gradual pauperization of vulnerable communities, rather than the outbreak of a sudden, 
natural occurrence. For example, analyses conducted by Goyder and Goyder on the Ethiopian 
famine of 1972-1973 (during which time Ethiopia was ruled by an autocratic monarch) found 
that the sustained and excessive taxation of rural sectors by the Ethiopian government repeatedly 
pushed these marginal peasant producers into famine conditions when such forms of taxation 
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were compounded by natural hazards or other environmental strains.126 Eventually, the suffering 
endured by the peasant masses during the famine of 1973-1977 led to the demise of Emperor 
Haile Selassie and the rise of a socialist military takeover. 
During the war and famine of 1983-1985, the Marxist government of Ethiopia instituted a 
widespread resettlement program. The implementation of these mass peasant  organizations, or 
“Kebele Farmers Associations”, sought to redistribute land among the masses and enhance 
agricultural output.127 However, governance under the Marxist regime was entirely inadequate 
and corrupt. Instead of investing in social goods, the government implemented nation-state 
building projects to bolster their power base. Kebele Associations thus became satellites of the 
central government and dropped all pretenses of enhancing agricultural output. The principal 
tasks of Kebele Associations quickly became apparent: the surveillance of communities for 
government purposes, the dissemination of propaganda, and the enforcement of government 
policies.128 As a result, the potential economic value of the program accorded little importance, 
and actually retarded agricultural production, while its greatest achievement was keeping an 
illegitimate regime in power.129  
This socialist regime marked a period of stagnation and lack of progress in the 
agricultural sector. Government policies throughout the era caused a noticeable drop in food 
entitlements as well as the real purchasing capacity of rural households, infinitely magnifying 
people’s risk to famine. The reasons behind these severe agricultural failures can be attributed 
most directly to poor policy implementation and the dominance of a highly defective, self-
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interested government. Among some of the most destructive policies enacted by the state were: 
the outlawing of hired labor on farmland, the fixing of official crop prices at artificially low 
levels, the high cost of fertilizers, and the forced requisition of a portion of agricultural output by 
government agencies.130 Combined, the productivity of Ethiopia’s agricultural sector plummeted 
in the early 1980s. Simultaneously, the state’s usurpation of a large portion of annual yields 
generated widespread resentment and mistrust towards government amongst farming 
communities. Ultimately, these policies destroyed livelihood security and placed farmers at 
much greater risk to famine. 
The socialist regime in Ethiopia also faced significant resource constraints, as the Cold 
War was in full swing. This stalled the efficacy of state-led famine mitigation projects. The 
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) was established immediately following the 
famines of the 1970s in an effort to provide safeguards and early warning mechanisms against 
famine. However, demographic factors made it difficult for the government to collect accurate 
data regarding which regions were at-risk and undernourished. Furthermore, it also became 
quickly apparent that the RRC failed to garner much attention from neither the international 
community nor from the Ethiopian government -- even when it sounded famine warnings to 
mobilize assistance.131 As the United Nations reported, the RRC Commission had been, “In fact 
very vocal in its warnings regarding the increasing incidence of food shortages [...] However, 
evidence is available that the regime, in its effort to legitimize its hold on power, had suppressed 
the magnitude of the 1984 famine”.132  
                                                
130 Ibid., 34. 
131 Derseh Endale, “The Ethiopian Famines Entitlements and Governance” (Working Papers 102, World Institute for 
Development and Economics Research - United Nations University, 1993), 21-25. 
132 Ibid., 37. 
 
 
 
63 
Ethiopia’s socialist government also devised a famine prevention resettlement scheme in 
the early 1980s with the ambitious objective of relocating approximately 2.5 million rural 
civilians from the drought-stricken regions of northern Ethiopia into the more fertile areas of the 
south. However, all this was done within the poor organizational and logistical capacity of the 
unpopular military regime. In almost every case, the northern populations were coerced and 
tricked into relocation by government forces, being tempted by the promise of food aid at certain 
locations.133 Yet, upon arrival they were loaded into trucks and sent to state-regulated settlements 
against their will.134 Never was there any sort of government assistance or compensation for their 
lost property and psychological trauma, nor was there help to establish new livelihoods.135 
Furthermore, the project inadvertently moved nearly a million families into the most malaria 
infested regions of the country.136 As Human Rights Watch noted, the program was a “disaster 
[...] and resulted in the deaths of a minimum of 50,000 people”.137 The project was part of a 
larger state-led process which regularized the use of counter-insurgency strategies by 
government forces. Such actions directly restricted the population’s access to critical resources 
(such as food and economic markets) and effectively destroyed the livelihood security of 
hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian citizens. Some of the most devastating of these counter-
insurgency tactics included: the forced relocation and control of the rural population, as well as 
the closure and military regulation of marketplaces, key roads, and transport links.138 These 
strategies not only prolonged the brutal government-led violence of the civil war, but also forced 
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millions into a state of severe vulnerability. Ultimately, such actions led to the famine of 1982-
1985 which is today responsible for the death of over one million people.  
Beyond resettlement, the government also impeded the transport of grains and cereals 
throughout the 1980s. Whether domestically produced or foreign disaster relief donations, the 
government blocked the delivery of foodstuffs to the most desperately ravaged regions of 
Ethiopia.139 These deprived areas were not only subject to severe drought, but they were also the 
stronghold of EPRDF resistance, and thus a primary target of military raids.140 To cut off their 
supplies, the government required that all foreign food aid donations were channeled through 
official state agencies.141 It is also important to note that widespread drought occurred in the 
regions worst hit by famine months after a humanitarian emergency was already declared in 
Ethiopia.142 By placing restrictions as well as various economic and social burdens upon 
Ethiopia’s displaced rural individuals, the state played an instrumental role in creating the 
infamous famine of 1984. It is estimated that this famine killed a minimum 400,000 people, 
while military casualties and deaths associated with forced relocations bring that number up to 
over a million.143  
As has been indicated, one of the greatest factors contributing to a population’s 
susceptibility to famine is the volatility of income and livelihood security. Government policies 
and military actions conducted throughout the 1980s highlight the fragility of Ethiopia’s rural 
economy. Even the slightest deviation from normal income for rural sector households in 
Ethiopia could mean destitution. The highly political roots of Ethiopia’s 1983 famine are further 
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reinforced by economic data which exposes the perceived government priorities at the time -- 
priorities which, it should be noted, do not acknowledge the needs of the people. Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s GNP per capita was declining across Ethiopia, averaging $190 USD in 1985 
(compared to $18,279 in the United States).144 The decline of GNP per capita which occurred 
across the twentieth century is indicative of the worsening poverty throughout the region. 
However, this also highlights another serious concern: self-sufficiency in food production has 
only decreased over the years.  
These are factors whose causes are not attributable to the severity of drought conditions. 
Rather, they are symptoms of the severe economic mismanagement and deficiencies in 
governance which took place under both the autocratic monarchy of the 1970s and the later 
socialist military regime of the 1980s. According to data collected by T.M. Vestal, only about 
19% of Ethiopia’s potentially cultivable land had been brought under production by 1985.145 By 
the end of the 1983 famine, Ethiopia was importing 70% more foodstuffs than had been brought 
in during the 1970s. Compare these facts to the level of Ethiopian food production immediately 
following World War II, whereby the nation -- using only traditional agricultural methods -- had 
enough surplus production to export food aid to the Middle East.146 With such considerations in 
mind one begins to appreciate that only by delineating a causal chain of historic events, 
developing a detailed understanding of the political economy within which Ethiopia’s famines 
emerge, can the underlying pressures that destroy livelihood security and inhibit people’s 
adaptive capacity be revealed as crucial mechanisms in driving the outbreak of famine.  
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As part of its cultural identity, Ethiopia is a state founded upon the principles of conquest. 
War between neighboring regions has always played a central role in characterizing traditional 
socio-political relations. The unremitting brutality of Ethiopia’s armed forces is a dominant 
element in its history of invasion, rebellion, and counter-insurgency campaigns.147 The 
significance of this in relation to natural disasters lies within the fact that, as a general rule, all 
politically motivated events have a direct influence upon the socio-economic position which 
citizens are forced to accept in the political fabric of the nation, as we saw in the case of Haiti. A 
person’s ethnicity, class orientation, gender, and racial identity each figure prominently in 
determining their respective entitlement to the resources essential for survival during times of 
environmental strain.148 As referenced in the opening pages of this chapter, the causal connection 
between decreased aggregate food supply (from failed crops and drought) and famine outbreak, 
while correct, avoids the larger array of forces behind famines. To merely attribute famine to a 
decline in food availability is to make the erroneous assumption that food availability is shared 
equally among the population and also that the people of Ethiopia have no sources of income 
beyond food production.149 Famines are a manifestation of changes to people’s access and 
entitlements to the foodstuffs of society, these being outcomes determined by a complex puzzle 
of cultural, political, and economic trends. Dynamic pressures such as warfare are prominent 
examples of the highly political forces behind famines, for such events have the capacity to 
destroy local economic systems and infrastructure across vast regions while also affecting 
production and trade capacity. As was addressed chapter one, warfare displaces immense 
numbers of people. It destroys people’s sources of income, homes, sense of security, and causes 
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overall levels of sanitation to decline. Combined, these conditions cause a greater number of 
people to become highly vulnerable to severe famine or to biological epidemics such as 
HIV/AIDs, malaria, and Ebola. Warfare itself thus creates a self-reinforcing cycle of heightened 
insecurity.  
Throughout Africa, the violence associated warfare destabilizes affected communities 
physically and economically. Armed conflict, whether perpetrated by government forces or 
paramilitary organizations, forces widespread migration and the displacement of innumerable 
civilians. This has been the case for Ethiopia’s famines between 1972-1973 and 1983-1984, 
throughout Sudan and South Sudan in recent decades, as well as in the conflict minerals regions 
of central Africa and Congo -- to name a few. A number of scholars have even gone so far as to 
highlight the strong correlation between high state military expenditures, exploitation of peasants 
(by limiting access to markets and outright coercion), and the rise of famine in the Horn of 
Africa.150 These characteristics are typical of Ethiopia’s ethnically-based wars of conquest as 
well. Even so, it is important to note that the consequences of violent conflict among vulnerable 
populations are not contained by political borders. Violence in one area often tends to generate 
regional instability and enduring humanitarian crises by increasing the number of stateless 
migrants in dire need of economic support and livelihood stability. Such facts highlight why 
research has increasingly indicated that the greatest cause of death from conflict in low income 
countries is not direct violence, but is actually the secondary impacts of war: disease, hunger, the 
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destruction of markets and infrastructure, and the massive disruption to livelihoods caused by 
people fleeing from the conflict.151 
These are among the most common ‘unsafe conditions’ and ‘dynamic pressures’ which 
increase people’s vulnerability to famine during a drought. Under such circumstances vast 
numbers of people lack assistance from the kind of stable, transparent, and responsive 
government which would provide the resources necessary to help them survive and cope with 
natural disasters. As Piers Blaikie et. al. elaborates within his analysis on the politics of famine, 
in agriculturally-based economies such as Ethiopia, war tends to reduce both the quantity of land 
that is planted in a season, as well as the amount of labor that is available to conduct such tasks, 
thus reducing the supply of food without even taking into account the shocks of potential 
environmental hazards.152 Warfare of all types can also play a more direct role in the creation of 
famine conditions, as testimony from survivors of the 1984-85 famine in Ethiopia highlights in 
vivid detail,  
“The army took 500 cows and oxen from my village, they burned people’s houses and 
took honey, butter and anything made of leather. They even took old clothes. They didn’t 
bother to carry the grain; they just burned it. The militia, they’re farmers from the area, 
they take our tools so that they can use them. They all take salt and coffee [...] They eat 
as much as they can and then sell what’s left. In 1982 the army came through our village 
and forced me to pay E$400. I had to borrow the money from a neighbor. Because of the 
money that I had to pay the army, and the grain that they burned, I had to sell all my 
animals in 1984. Now I have nothing”.153 
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Such testimony reinforces that it is not necessarily a decline in food production or availability 
which precedes the outbreak of famine. Rather, it is the possibility of a decline in entitlements 
and access to foodstuffs as a result of violence, coercion, or otherwise. These acts may be 
conducted by armed rebel forces, or in some cases, by the state itself, as occurred in Ethiopia 
from 1972 to 1973 and again a decade later.  
Yet, warfare is not the only political pressure which generates widespread vulnerability to 
famine. Subtler socio-political trends also highlight the important role of ideological 
preconceptions in influencing policy decisions, in turn determining the manifestation of disaster. 
By looking at the government’s expenditures from 1979 to 1984, it becomes clear that the most 
significant sectors of the economy relating to food production only received 4.8% of the national 
budget, while 58.6% was allocated for “general services” (this included defense, public order and 
security).154 In a more contemporary context, the case of the marginalized Oromo ethnic majority 
in Ethiopia under the current government’s Anti-Terror Proclamation and Addis Ababa Master 
Expansion Plan, is a paralleling expression of how ethnic biases can lead to the targeted and 
state-directed marginalization of a people, forcing them into famine conditions. It is to this issue 
which the discussion will now turn. 
The Oromo are Ethiopia's biggest ethnic group, accounting for about a third of the state’s 
95 million people. However, the major political party of the Oromo people, the Oromo Federalist 
Congress (OFC), does not hold even a single seat in parliament. Ethnic Oromo are traditionally 
pastoral farming communities, yet government plans for economic development threaten this 
population’s way of life. The current Tigrayan minority regime has been able to maintain a 
monopoly over political expression in Ethiopia through corrupt and coercive means. This has 
                                                
154 The World Bank Group, Recent Economic Developments and Prospects for Recovery and Growth (Washington 
D.C.: The World Bank, 1985). 
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resulted in state perpetration of grave human rights violations against many of the nation’s ethnic 
groups, including the Oromo. The Tigrayan government is known for their long history of 
violent repression against independent media, civil society organizations, and political 
opposition. Repeatedly, the administration has enacted draconian laws that reinforce the gradual 
breakdown of civil society. By manipulating the jurisdiction of federal counter-terrorism 
legislation, the current regime has stifled the voices of Oromo protesters who attempt to 
peacefully express their concerns about the federal government’s approach to development.155 
More specifically, protesters have indicated great discontent with the Addis Ababa Integrated 
Development Master Plan (AAIDMP) which will expand the capital city into the communally 
held territory of Oromo farmers, displacing tens of thousands of people and destroying their 
livelihoods.156 The aims of the AAIDMP are further reinforced by recent economic development 
policies supported by the IMF and World Bank. Again, the result will be to eradicate the means 
of subsistence for thousands of Ethiopian families. 
The second dominant catalyst of protest in Ethiopia results from enduring ethnic 
discontent and a deeper crisis of representation that has marginalized the Oromo and Amhara 
populations both politically and economically. Since 2014, the government has been operating 
under a newly-formulated, long-term economic development strategy of “Agriculture 
Development Led Industrialization” (ADLI). This policy is geared towards the transformation of 
the nation’s previously ‘backward economic structure’ of communal landholdings in the 
                                                
155 Amnesty International, Ethiopia: Civil society groups urge the international community to address killing of 
Oromo protesters (Washington D.C.: Amnesty International, 2016). Available at: 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/ethiopia-civil-society-groups-urge-the-international-community-to-
address-killing-of-oromo-protester.  
156 Felix Horne, Such a Brutal Crackdown: Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia’s Oromo Protests (New 
York: Human Rights Watch, 2016), 1-3. 
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agricultural sector, towards privately owned, industrialized production.157 This new development 
plan is two-pronged, incorporating export led economic growth with the domestic expansion of 
agriculture and industry into corporate holdings. The Ethiopian government has repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of widespread privatization as part of their goal: a real GDP growth 
rate of 11% and meeting the Millennium Development goals.158 Combined with its efforts to 
expand agricultural production, the government has encouraged the construction of industrial 
factories and the sale of lands (including water rights) to Chinese hydropower companies to 
expand the economy.159 Such large-scale alterations to land tenure practices, combined with the 
build-up of previously unregulated territory throughout Ethiopia, have had a major impact upon 
the ability for low-income and agriculturally-based populations to access the resources essential 
to their survival. 
The current government in Ethiopia has a persistent history of violent suppression of 
independent media, civil society organizations, and political opposition. The government has 
enacted many restrictive laws that enfeeble civil society and, in conjunction with the misuse of 
the counter-terrorism law, stifle peaceful dissent. Since the AAIDMP was first published in 
2010, Oromos have faced a brutal crackdown by government forces following what were 
initially peaceful protests. Numerous human rights organizations have documented the arbitrary 
arrests, torture, and injuries suffered by thousands of individuals residing in Oromia since the 
regime first came to power in the 1990s. Between 2011 and 2014 alone, at least 5,000 Oromos 
                                                
157 UN Economic and Social Council, The Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy (Geneva: 
The United Nations, 2016). Available at: https://webapps01.un.org/nvp/indpolicy.action?id=124 . Accessed on 
November 12, 2016. 
158 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, “The Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Growth and Transformation Plan,” September 4, 2010. Available at: 
http://www.iea.org/media/pams/ethiopia/Ethiopia_GTP_2010to2915.pdf. 
159 International Rivers, Chinese Dams in Africa (Berkeley: International Rivers, 2016). Available at: 
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were arrested based on their actual or suspected opposition to the government.160 The individuals 
targeted by the government include thousands of peaceful protesters and hundreds of political 
opposition members. Some estimates place the number of persons killed by government forces at 
the beginning of 2016 at over 400.161 However, the exact numbers remain unclear, as the bodies 
of thousands of disappeared individuals have not been found, and many remains are yet to be 
identified.162 Exact data regarding the nature and regularity of these government attacks is also 
vague, as independent media and human rights organizations are banned from entry into the 
country. The only information available to the global audience is the testimony of survivors and 
those lucky enough to escape.  
Famine in Ethiopia was announced by the United Nations on July 20, 2011. However, 
drought was declared about six months after the government-led attacks began, with the most 
severely drought-affected regions being in the eastern parts of Ethiopia. Further analysis of the 
graphs provided below demonstrate a clear difference between territories under severe drought 
conditions (located further east of Oromia) and other areas of severe famine conditions which 
are, surprisingly, not suffering from a dramatic drought.  
                                                
160 Amnesty International, Ethiopia: Ethnic Oromos arrested, tortured and killed by the state in relentless repression 
of dissent (Washington D.C.: Amnesty International, 2014). Available at: http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-
item/ethiopia-ethnic-oromos-arrested-tortured-and-killed-by-the-state-in-relentless-repression-of-dissent  
161 Felix Horne, Such a Brutal Crackdown: Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia’s Oromo Protests (New 
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What these figures indicate is a high discrepancy between areas of severe drought 
(mostly in the south-east of Ethiopia) and regions of high food insecurity and famine across the 
nation. Therefore, while there is famine in the regions suffering from severe drought, the lack of 
such dire environmental conditions in and around, especially to the north of, Addis Ababa 
(where there also exists severe famine) would imply that other factors beyond environmental 
stressors are indeed central to creating the famine currently underway in the Horn of Africa. 
Since the Oromo crackdown began, Ethiopian politics has undergone an important 
transformation to how relations of power are understood and assets are distributed. In regards to 
agriculture, the fundamentals of Ethiopia’s development strategy include,  
“The shift to produce high value crops, with a special focus on high-potential areas, 
facilitating the commercialization of agriculture, supporting the development of large-
scale commercial agriculture where it is feasible. The commercialization of smallholder 
farming will continue to be the major source of agricultural growth. To complement this 
concerted support will be an increase to private investment in large commercial 
farms.”163 
    
In effect, these policies redefine Ethiopia’s political economy. The current development strategy 
has already created consequential shifts in how societal pressures interact to affect the outbreak 
of disaster. The combined effects of Ethiopia’s fragile ecosystem, deforestation, chronic 
uncertainties over land tenure, lack of rural credit, and the monopolistic power of certain ethnic 
groups over markets, have serious implications for understanding the roots of the current famine 
in Ethiopia. Since 2015 alone, thousands of individuals have been detained while hundreds of 
homes and businesses have been destroyed by government security forces in an effort to stifle 
                                                
163 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, “The Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Growth and Transformation Plan,” September 8, 2010. Available at: 
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voices of dissent.164 These acts effectively destroy fragile livelihoods beyond repair, while also 
weakening the resilience of the environment against hazards such as drought or flood. The threat 
of state-sanctioned violence against those who speak out in protest of government policies, 
combined with the usurpation of traditionally pastoral farmlands by government and 
multinational corporations, forces Ethiopian pastoralists into an even more severe state of 
vulnerability. 
In recent years Addis Ababa has experienced significant growth. Yet, as noted, Ethiopia’s 
development policies have destabilized the livelihood security of many families due to forced 
and widespread land privatization, especially amongst the farming communities that account for 
approximately 75% of the population.165  Rarely have authorities provided compensation for the 
confiscation and sale of people’s territory; when restitutions are provided they do not come close 
to covering the loss of livelihoods incurred.166 Farmers rarely if ever receive alternate land, and 
the courts (which are effectively under the control of the government) provide no recourse for 
these losses.167 As a  result, ADLI and the AAIDMP have increased the vulnerability of 
marginalized communities to disaster by severely restricting people’s entitlements to even the 
most basic goods and services, by routinely violating people’s human rights, and by 
simultaneously destroying the income security of millions. 
Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s rapid economic expansion has allowed the state to become a 
prominent ‘success story’ for transformational development in the eyes of the West. However, in 
Ethiopia, like China, economic development has come at the expense of human rights and the 
                                                
164 Felix Horne, Such a Brutal Crackdown: Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia’s Oromo Protests (New 
York: Human Rights Watch, 2016), 1-3.  
165 Employment in Agriculture (Percentage of total employment) available at World Bank Group database: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=ET . 
166 Hilary Matfess, “Ethiopian Activists Fight U.S.-Backed Land Siezures,” Foreign Policy in Focus, September 9, 
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strength of civil society. Ethiopia is seen as a reliable police officer in the region: hosting a US 
military base and sending troops to fight the Islamist militant group, Al-Shabaab in neighboring 
Somalia.  However, the Western support currently enjoyed by the regime has meant that the 
international community will continue to turn a blind eye to the perilous displacement of 
thousands of the individuals affected by national development projects. The stateless and 
marginal status of the farming villages impacted by state policies forces them into severe 
insecurity. Access to land continues to be restricted and entitlement to traditional resources 
forcibly revoked.  
The country's current development strategy is supported by an economic reform program 
developed in cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF, focusing on a series of structural 
adjustment programs which have been implemented since 1992. In order to support economic 
growth in Ethiopia and other African states, dominant Western nations and multilateral 
institutions (including USAID and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) have drifted away 
from the food security strategies devised in the 2009 G8 L’Aquila Summit. These strategic food 
security plans called for $20 billion to support state-owned agricultural production in Africa, yet 
they have been pushed aside in favor of widespread privatization campaigns.168 This shift 
represents an unprecedented push to favor private sector and market-driven food systems through 
aid programs, such as that embodied by Ethiopia’s current Growth and Transformation Plan. The 
2012 G8 initiative, called the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, launched in 
partnership with various agribusinesses, seeks to increase private investment in African 
agriculture. Private sector companies have collectively committed more than $3 billion to 
increase investments, while donor partners have pledged to support Africa’s potential for rapid 
                                                
168 The White House Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: G-8 Action on Food Security and Nutrition,” The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, May 18, 2012. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
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and sustained agricultural growth.169 These projects have already begun in Ethiopia, figuring 
centrally in the outline of ADLI.  
 However, the imposition of this agenda comes with new aid conditionality. In order to 
receive aid through the New Alliance, African partner countries have to commit to structural and 
economic reforms that facilitate business in agriculture, part of which includes the privatization 
of industries for economic output.170 It is this internationally mandated land privatization, 
however, which is generating a great deal of displacement, diminished livelihood opportunities, 
and increased economic insecurity throughout Ethiopia. As noted previously, for the pastoral 
communities of Ethiopia, access to wide swaths of arable land and freedom of movement are 
vital concerns when resources become scarce during a drought. The usurpation of grazing lands 
by various interest groups has caused the displacement, suffering, and even death of many 
Ethiopians from famines directly attributable to a decline in popular land entitlements. 
The new economic policies promoted by multilateral institutions and the Ethiopian 
government also call for the use of hybrid and GMO seeds, pesticides, and synthetic fertilizers, 
as well as a shift towards monocrop and cash-crop production systems.171 The implementation of 
these agricultural practices, however, will not only destroy traditional, collectivized forms of 
pastoral farming (which preserve biodiversity and soil integrity through crop rotation), but will 
also further diminish the capacity for farming communities to adapt to adverse environmental 
hazards and control their economic opportunities. Many people will be forced into unsafe living 
spaces or relegated economic conditions, while biodiversity will continue to deteriorate and 
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agricultural production become increasingly industrialized. Prior experiences have exposed the 
unsustainability of a food system based on intensive use of petrol products and chemical inputs, 
many of which are heightened by climate change and the global energy crisis. The conventional 
agricultural model that prevails in the global food chain accounts for at least 14% of total annual 
greenhouse gas emissions, mostly due to the use of nitrogen fertilizers.172 The African region is 
already highly vulnerable to environmental hazards. The political situation within many nations 
creates great risk and instability for the local people. Meanwhile, the land faces a tenuous 
existence under mono-cropping, GMO production, and synthetic fertilizer use. The rise of 
industrialized and privatized agricultural production in Ethiopia will only exacerbate the 
vulnerability of farming communities throughout the region -- with likely consequences for the 
populations of neighboring states as well. 
Already, Ethiopia’s development policies have stripped many farmers of the little 
political and economic power they once held. Instead, the state is concentrating corporate control 
over seeds, land, and water to promote rapid economic expansion. Many communities are being 
forced to accept poorly paid and insecure wage work, while important historical and cultural 
connections to the land are being severed by commodification and commercialization. The result 
is the promotion of self-interest by a few rich nations, and greater livelihood insecurity amongst 
thousands of individuals, such as the Oromo of Ethiopia. As policy analyst, Anuradha Mittal 
noted,  
“In order to foster private investments, governments are being forced to open their 
agricultural sector to seed, pesticide and fertilizer corporations, release land for 
commercial agriculture, and reduce taxes and tariffs for agribusinesses. In short, facilitate 
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the destruction of family farming and natural resources for the sake of corporate 
profit.”173  
The resulting pollution of water resources from excessive chemical pesticides and fertilizers will 
also exacerbate soil degradation. Ecological imbalances will continue to worsen due to rising 
deforestation for agribusiness projects. Ultimately, the privatization and consolidation of 
agricultural production across Ethiopia (and Africa generally) can be anticipated to increase 
corruption and conflicts of interest. What the current African development paradigm represents 
is a future of frequent social upheaval by the landless and marginalized pastoral communities, 
the rising impoverishment of rural households, and a reduction in the number of alternatives for 
income security amongst these at-risk populations. 
Combine these factors with the cyclically recurring droughts experienced throughout the 
West African region, and the famine currently underway in Ethiopia becomes a disaster of 
deeply political, social, and economic roots which was merely triggered by the el Niño drought. 
Droughts have been a normal element of Ethiopia’s climate for centuries, and the recurrence of 
dry spells periodically do not typically lead to such disastrous outcomes for the populations who 
depend upon the rains for food security. Current political unrest in the Ethiopia, compounded by 
the government’s unwillingness to allow outside humanitarian organizations inside the country 
for fear that they may document current human rights violations (as well as institutional 
insecurities resulting from the violence) make getting emergency aid to these farming 
communities very difficult. Currently over 10.2 million people are affected by the famine in 
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Ethiopia.174 In February 2016 the Secretary General of Ethiopia stressed that a crisis of this scale, 
“Was too much for any Government [...] The international community must stand with people of 
Ethiopia. Immediate support for Ethiopia will save lives and avoid preventable suffering. 
Immediate support will also safeguard the impressive development gains that Ethiopia has made 
over the past years and decades”.175 Still, however, international aid agencies are not permitted 
within the state by government forces, and aid must be channeled through the distribution 
mechanisms directed by the regime. Government restrictions upon the flow of people, 
information, and goods across Ethiopia’s borders have made it increasingly difficult to collect 
definitive data regarding the severity of the current famine as well as to catalogue the number 
victims from state-led violence. Only time will tell as to how the international community may 
choose to respond to this disaster, but with the Ethiopian Government’s recent ascent to the UN 
Security Council and seat at the UN Human Rights Commission, it seems unlikely that 
conditions will change in the foreseeable future. 
Ultimately what we must take away from this historical exploration is the central role 
which government and civil society alike play in precipitating the outbreak of famine in the 
modern era. While true that environmental processes are often the catalyst behind natural 
disasters, it is important to understand that anthropogenic pressures and the socio-political trends 
of these regions are what ultimately give rise to famine conditions. Such is done by altering 
peoples’ access and entitlements to the resources needed to survive in the face of drought. The 
chain of events preceding famine shows that the state plays a direct role in either the prevention 
of or creation of famine conditions within their borders. The outcome of a natural hazard is 
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entirely dependent upon the ideological preconceptions held by the government, for these 
ideologies direct the policy decisions and priorities governments may choose to emphasize. In 
the case of Ethiopia, this is made evident by the regime’s support of economic development 
through neoliberal mechanisms, rather than promoting social justice by supporting the needs of 
civilians and upholding the rule of law. The political and economic decisions made as a result of 
such a policy orientation is the predominant cause of the famine in Ethiopia we see today. 
 
Chapter 4: The Political Economy of Disaster Relief  
– A Case Study of Earthquakes in Nepal 
April 25, 2015 was a calm, sunny day in the Himalayas along the Nepal-Tibet border. 
Gore Ghale had just recently arrived in Malaysia to begin work as a construction assistant. He 
was constantly thinking of his beloved wife and five children back home in Nepal, whom he had 
left for a better paying job overseas. At this same moment, his wife, Niru, was with two of their 
children in Trizuli Bazaar, a rudimentary town approximately four-hours driving (plus a three-
hour trek) from their family village of Thangdor. She had just gone for the day to look for work, 
leaving their eldest three children home to attend to the goats and crops, as planting season was 
just a few weeks away. However, Trizuli Bazaar was not the place to be on April 25, 2015. The 
site was only 40 miles from the epicenter of an impending 7.8 magnitude earthquake.  
 It was midday, children were outside playing along the terraced hillsides of Thangdor, 
and women were collecting water to carry on their backs up the steep cliff sides towards their 
hut-like dwellings. “My children and I were inside when the walls began to sway, and the world 
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came crashing down around us,” one woman recalled.176 Screaming in Trizuli Bazaar, Niru and 
her children ran outside where tall trees quivered like blades of grass. “It was utter chaos,” she 
sobbed. “People were screaming and buildings crumpled like matchboxes, burying many alive.” 
Sleeping outside in the freezing cold that night, Niru had little idea that it would be an entire 
month before she could return to Thangdor. Niru had to wait nearly thirty days to find out that 
the bodies of her three eldest children were never found in the rubble that remained of their 
home. Meanwhile, Gore was on a two-year contract in Malaysia, unable to return to Thangdor 
until January 2017, and this left Niru with her two surviving children alone in a heap of 
destruction and isolation. “We huddled together outside our destroyed homes,” Niru recalled 
once she made it back to Thangdor. “My two children were badly injured, but I had no means or 
money to go to the hospital in Kathmandu. We did what we could for food. So many animals 
crushed to death -- including mine. We waited for months before any government help came. My 
neighbor has donated her cowshed for us to live in until we build a new home,” She said, 
pointing to a straw shelter in the distance, covered with tarp as a shield against the cold 
Himalayan wind. The story of Niru and her family is unfortunately one which is not unique 
amongst those who live in rural Nepal, yet it is a story which presents great insight into the role 
of political incentives, from both domestic and international actors, in affecting the outcome of 
natural hazards upon demographic regions of high risk and vulnerability. By tracing the political 
history of Nepal over the past century, and later analyzing earthquake mitigation efforts through 
a political economy framework, this case study will expose the highly political dimensions of 
creating natural disasters in Nepal. 
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Two years have passed since the 7.8 magnitude earthquake shook the earth, yet still the 
villagers of Thangdor and the surrounding rural communities have not seen any government 
assistance or significant international aid. Simultaneously, environmental conditions continue to 
exacerbate people’s suffering: the river which this community used to depend upon for all means 
of subsistence has been submerged somewhere under the rocky mountainside after the 
earthquake shifted the terrain indefinitely. Each day, women and children carry approximately 
100 kilograms of water on their backs over the cliffs towards Thangdor, transporting this basic 
necessity from the next closest aquifer nearly a thirteen-hour trek away. No road connects these 
two locations so as to expedite the process. While local leaders have issued reports of emergency 
need to the Regional Administration Office (beginning as early as July 2015), the villagers are 
still awaiting any form of acknowledgement by the local government. In Nepal, where 
approximately 80% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture for livelihood security, the 
loss of water resources has caused immense suffering and exacerbated the effects of the recent 
disaster amongst those already most vulnerable.177 What is of even greater concern, however, is 
the fact that the government has yet to address the complete lack of basic human necessities in 
these regions, prolonging the period of disaster recovery and crisis indefinitely.  Even two years 
after the quake, people still lack access to sufficient and clean water, sanitation, health care, 
adequate nutrition, and proper shelter.  
For centuries, Nepal has been widely accepted as one of the most at-risk locations on 
earth for earthquakes, yet this common fact has done nothing to alter the country’s level of 
disaster preparedness. The reasons behind Nepal’s excessive risk and vulnerability to natural 
                                                
177 Over 80 percent of the population is involved in agriculture as of 2016, and this constitutes approximately 41 
percent of GDP according to World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files. Likewise, 
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disasters are dynamic and complex, originating in the nation’s political history, economic status, 
and cultural orientation. In order to better understand this phenomenon, it is useful to review the 
pressure and release model devised by Blaikie et al. (see Figure 1 below)  
 
 
Looking at this model, it is apparent that political and economic systems are essential to 
understanding how the evolution of policies, widespread access to information, and the 
allocation of public goods can engender the outcome of hazards upon a demographic of high 
vulnerability. Bodies with the capacity to alter these dynamic pressures, such as government 
officials, NGOs, and foreign aid donors, all act within a highly political space, and in many ways 
disasters are an outcome of these political networks. In the case of Nepal, the government is still 
woefully in-equipped to address the impacts of such hazards, largely due to the nation’s shaky 
	FIGURE	1	
Source: Piers M. Blaikie, Ben Wisner, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis. At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's 
Vulnerability, and Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994). 
 
 
 
 
85 
political history over the past century and current economic situation. However, by 
understanding the roots of the current conditions in Nepal, the reasons behind such poor 
preparation and response on the part of government becomes quite clear, and the outcomes of 
hazards such as the 2015 earthquake become almost predictable.  
Modern day Nepal came into being in the second half of the 18th Century when the Shah 
monarchy unified fifty small states through military force, thus creating a highly fragmented 
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-lingual nation-state landlocked between 
India and China. This new state was organized along the rules of traditional Hindu law, with a 
small number of men from the high Hindu castes dominating all public spheres at the exclusion 
of women and untouchable castes.178 Such trends of exclusion are still prevalent today; the 
dominant order is confined to male Brahmans and Kshatriyas (of the rural Hill Hindu groups) 
and the urban Newars.179 Prolonged forms of exclusion, even under the newly ‘democratic’ 
government of Nepal give reason to much of the growing political unrest in the country. Central 
to the organization of the Nepalese state has been the dominance of Hindu law and a caste-based 
hierarchical system that prioritizes high-caste male elites. Within this system of caste 
organization also exist multiple ethnic identities and religious orientations, with approximately 
10% of the population identifying as Buddhist and 5% as Muslim.180 The distinguishing features 
of Nepalese caste and ethnic identity are complex and often overlapping. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to accurately delineate such kinship systems in this brief discussion. However, what 
must be understood is that all rights, duties, and forms of punishment in Nepal are traditionally 
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determined by an individual’s specific caste and ethnic orientation -- thus further complicating 
our understanding of how prior Nepalese political structures have helped to effectuate the biases 
and ideologies inherent to the current system.181  
From 1846 until 1951, the Hindu Rana oligarchy dominated the Kingdom of Nepal, 
bringing important changes to the central state structure while also perpetuating the non-
inclusive social system of caste and gender discrimination. All actions under the Rana 
administration were directed by three basic practices: chakari (sycophancy), chaplusy (flattery), 
and chukli (intelligence work conducted in exchange for political favors).182 Each of these 
traditions reinforced the dominance of a corrupt, autocratic, and unaccountable system of 
governance. Throughout the era, Nepal was also under the influence British colonial powers 
from India, and thus maintained a very secluded position on the international stage. Economic 
isolation would continue up until the abolition of the Rana oligarchy, marked by the passage of 
the Interim Government of Nepal Act in 1951. At this time, various underrepresented groups 
began to form a distinct political consciousness, each striving for personal power and privileges 
within government – a stark contrast from the Rana period whereby minimum attention was 
given to improving the lives of the people or broadening political freedoms.183   
The 1950s marked an opening of political space promoted by efforts to frame a new 
Nepalese constitution that would establish a republican, representative government based on the 
British model. The development of young political groups in the late 20th century also fostered 
the emergence of civil society, something which has since grown as a force of political influence, 
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albeit a hesitant one. However, even with greater socio-economic liberties, many of the new 
political leaders of the 1950s and 60s were of the same high Hindu castes from the Rana period 
(known as Tagadhari), and political leadership remained exclusive to men of this caste.184 The 
politics of these groups also highlights an important and enduring mentality characteristic of 
Nepalese political leaders: that one’s own people await and demand certain personal advantages 
and privileges from ‘their’ leaders in government.185 This mentality has proven to be a prominent 
force behind government policy formulation even in the modern era, as rural areas which lack 
representation in Parliament receive few if any public services or political attention. 
Nepal has seen significant political upheaval over the last century, and this has 
contributed enormously to the current failure of government to mitigate the effects of recent 
earthquakes and other natural hazards. With the anti-Rana Revolution of 1951, autocratic 
monarchy was effectively abolished in Nepal thanks to the efforts of student protestors, military 
groups, and the support of many elite Nepalese Hindus residing in India.186 Following the 
Revolution, a period of quasi-constitutional rule dominated under the 1959 Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Nepal. At this time the monarch, assisted by the leaders of fledgling political parties, 
governed the country. However, in 1960 King Mahendra attempted a coup and promulgated a 
new constitution, endowing himself with the powers of executive, legislative, and judicial 
authority combined.187 In the months that followed, the elected Prime Minister, members of 
Parliament and hundreds of democratic activists were arrested -- a trend which would continue 
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over the next thirty years of rule under King Mahendra and later his son, Birendra.188 In 1979 
student demonstrations and opposition groups grew increasingly vocal in their dissatisfaction 
with government, at times even violent. This prompted King Birendra to call for a national 
referendum on May 24, thereby deciding whether Nepal should transition to a multiparty system 
so as to quell the unrest and protect the monarchy.189 The efforts made to resolve disputes over 
government were tumultuous, however, as the leaders of the numerous political parties were 
neither able nor willing to cooperate with one another.190 Civil unrest and political upheaval 
continued.  
Things shifted in 1990 when Nepal made the formal transition towards a parliamentary 
democracy. Often referred to as a ‘people’s movement’, this democratic transition marks the first 
time in Nepali history that the two primary democratic forces, the Nepalese Congress and allied 
communist groups known as the United Left Front, were able to join together towards a common 
goal.191 While successful in forcing King Birendra to renounce his absolutist claim to power 
(becoming instead a constitutional monarch) there was limited success in actually implementing 
the necessary changes to institutionalize a democratic system. As before, the various parties 
involved in the democratic transition were unable to reach an agreement as to how constitutional 
changes should be made and to what extent democratic principles should be applied.192 The 
resulting Constitution thus retained many ambiguities that perpetuated the exclusion of lower 
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caste groups, women, and marginalized ethnic identities from participation in political life -- 
such as denying women the right to pass their citizenship to their children or explicitly protecting 
‘traditional’ Nepalese practices that necessitate caste discrimination.193 This administration was 
also highly centralized; efficiency was often constrained by time and inadequate resources, 
making it difficult for the executive to respond to any of the myriad issues faced by the young 
and impoverished government.194 The result was a state of general neglect for many of the 
nation’s most pressing concerns, thereby preventing the development of the inclusive state and 
Constitution which so many social groups across the country desired. Furthermore, it turns out 
that the party elites of this new democratic order were the same high Hindu castes whose 
ideologies had dominated prior regimes, leaving little room for greater inclusion of marginalized 
ethnic and religious groups in the process of creating a Constitution. People who had been 
instrumental to the politics of suppression under the Rana regime once more came to rule under 
the ‘democratic’ government of this new Nepalese system.195 
Therefore, the 1990 Constitution which arose from this transition was equally 
exclusionary. Political opposition was given little space to voice opinions and no ability to 
influence policy decisions, leaving informal methods, such as strikes and protests (which often 
became violent), as the only means of articulating opposition party demands.196 After 1990, 
Nepal remained a Hindu state and its foundations embedded in the culture and values of the 
ruling elite. Many hierarchical institutions, especially powerful informal networks of inter-caste 
behavior, remained unchanged, even with the formal declarations of equality made by the 1990 
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Constitution.197 As before, the needs and views of rural peasants were repeatedly pushed to the 
margins of political discussions. This left the impoverished masses (nearly all of whom were of 
the ‘untouchable’ Dalits caste, ethnic Janajatis, or Muslims) economically isolated and 
effectively disenfranchised. The ultimate result was to exacerbate the vulnerability of these rural, 
underrepresented sectors of society in ways which are still obvious to this day. In a society 
characterized by abject poverty and socio-religious inequalities, the Nepalese people were 
desperate for the kind of political representation which would introduce new opportunities for 
changing their fate.198 It was this general sentiment which gave the late 20th Century Maoist 
insurgency such strong support, especially from the rural sectors.199  
In February 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal took steps to replace the parliamentary 
monarchy with a people's democratic republic. The events that followed quickly spiraled into 
what has become known as the Nepalese Civil War. The Maoists constantly attacked the stability 
of the Nepalese Congress that came from the 1990 Constitution.200 On June 1, 2001, the royal 
line of Nepal began to unravel: Prince Dipendra assassinated nine members of the royal family, 
including King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya, before shooting himself.201 Meanwhile, the civil 
war raged on, and in October 2002 the government decided it was impossible to hold new 
elections. When the term of office for local bodies elected in 1998 expired, the government was 
temporarily deposed by executive order.202 This left King Gyanendra in complete control until a 
week later when he reappointed another government. On February 1, 2005, Gyanendra again 
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dismissed the entire government and assumed full executive powers, declaring a state of 
emergency in an attempt to destroy the people’s revolution.203 Taking desperate measures, 
Gyanendera put politicians under house arrest, cut phone and internet lines across the country, 
and severely curtailed freedom of the press.204 In November of that year, leaders of various 
political parties in Parliament responded by signing a 12-point agreement and collectively led the 
mass protest that forced the king to step down.205  Beginning January 17, 2007, Nepal was 
governed by a unicameral legislature under an interim constitution drafted by the Nepalese 
parliament of 1998 and the Maoist groups. Since 2008, however, the government of Nepal has 
again changed eight times.206 
Over the years, these frequent upheavals of government have badly hampered the 
country’s development and economic growth. Since 1990 the Nepalese constitution has been 
revised and rewritten numerous times and even now, with the most recent constitution’s 
promulgation, there is no sign of political stability in Nepal. The game of incessant government 
toppling and subsequent formation still dominates the national political arena. Many castes and 
ethnic groups, as well as women, continue to face severe political repression and lack of 
constitutional rights. As a World Bank report published in 2006 found, caste and gender together 
account for a third of national variation in empowerment and inclusion levels; the 
aforementioned lower castes are not only subject to severe political exclusion, but also show 
significantly higher rates of poverty, infant mortality, illiteracy, and dramatically lower life 
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expectancies.207 Democracy is still a long way off in Nepal, for with the latest constitution that 
came into effect on September 20, 2015, protests have once more broken out into violence in 
demand of ethnic equality before the law. Such rampant instability has made earthquake relief 
aid unreliable in many crucial areas of Nepal, especially along the Indian border. Furthermore, 
with corruption levels at an all-time high (Nepal scores a 29/100 on Transparency International’s 
CPI), much of the aid coming in merely lines the pockets of officials who view their time in 
government as a tenuous arrangement.208 
The impact of the 2015 earthquake itself is not what has created a natural disaster in 
Nepal. Rather, this natural shock was merely the catalyst behind a chain of politically-based 
events, precipitating disaster only through the combined effects of natural and anthropogenic 
forces. With this in mind, it is useful to once more review the definition of natural disasters. 
These are crises which happen suddenly, being defined as hazards which have reached one or 
more acute stages of damage to the populations affected. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, a disaster is defined as a “Natural event, such as a flood, earthquake, or hurricane 
that causes great damage or loss of life”.209 The term ‘natural disaster’ thus refers to the net 
impact of a natural hazard upon a population where there is substantial suffering. Most important 
in this definition of natural disasters, however, is the understanding that disasters are a 
phenomenon whereby something can be done to mitigate their effects, either before or after they 
occur. It is the damage incurred by a hazard which defines the disaster.210 Therefore, in line with 
the framework of analysis developed thus far, the study of natural disasters in Nepal must be 
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analyzed in a manner which views these crises as the intersection of two opposing forces: the 
social, political, and economic trends which generate vulnerability on the one hand, and the 
physical exposure to hazards on the other. 
Natural disasters occur in a highly political space, and while the exact moment that a 
hazard strikes is not explicitly a political event, the environment in which it strikes is absolutely 
political. Policy decisions, especially those regarding public goods and service provisions, have 
the greatest potential to mitigate and even prevent the escalation of hazards into disasters.211 
Public goods and policies can assuage the effects of poverty, poor health, and low levels of 
education. They can also improve quality of services, enhance access to communication 
networks, and alter other factors which shape a people’s vulnerability to disasters. The incentives 
faced by political actors to favor certain regions over others directly effects the adaptive capacity 
and vulnerability of certain demographic regions in the face of hazards. The cost-benefit analyses 
inherent to resource distribution decisions can even be so strong as to determine whether a 
disaster may arise at all.212 In Nepal, as with all other nations,  the political decisions and 
incentives made in regard to disaster mitigation and recovery are part of a larger function of 
resource allocation based on notions of utility.  
Governments derive utility from social welfare, political power, and financial capital, 
determining the level of investment towards each respective policy option depending upon the 
potential gains associated with these choices. Investment in public goods can effectively reduce 
mortality from all types of hazards, as such investments improve people’s ability to adapt and 
cope in the face of adverse environmental situations. For example, when allocated properly, 
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public expenditures on health and education can overcome market failures that exacerbate 
poverty and also those which diminish government credibility.213 Especially in wealthy 
democracies where political decision makers are typically held accountable to the public for re-
election, there is a stronger incentive to provide public goods proven to diminish incidences of 
disaster, and oftentimes correspondingly lower disaster mortality rates.214 One possible reason for 
this is the strong tendency amongst citizens to vote against politicians from the incumbent ruling 
party following a disaster, irrespective of relief spending (although relief spending does have the 
potential to offset the entire political cost of presiding over a disaster in its own right).215 As a 
result, there is a strong incentive amongst truly democratic governments to reduce the incidence 
of disasters through preventative policies and public expenditures so as to preserve their political 
reputation.216 However, regardless of regime type, cross-country analyses from Asia, Europe, and 
the Americas all find that relief spending provides the greatest utility for governments, as it is 
most visible to the public and therefore the government can take greater credit.217  A report by 
Kahn et. al. even found data supporting the claim that democracies suffer fewer deaths from 
natural disasters than non-democracies. Since 1975, 244 earthquakes (five or greater on the 
Richter scale) resulting in at least one death have occurred, and of these the average death in 
countries with competitive elections is 629 while in non-democracies the death toll is 
approximately 3,737.218  
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In regards to income, current data also highlights an interesting trend. In 1999 a 7.6 
magnitude earthquake killed more than 17,000 in Turkey, while a magnitude 7.7 earthquake in 
densely populated Taiwan killed merely 2,300 in the same year. In Taiwan, per capita income 
was three times greater than in Turkey, and deaths in Turkey were seven times higher. Placing 
Nepal within this comparison further reinforces the trend: per capita income is approximately six 
times greater in Taiwan than Nepal, and in Taiwan a similar magnitude earthquake resulted in 
five times fewer casualties.219 This indicates an important question regarding the correlation 
between natural disaster outbreaks and national wealth: why would the impact of hazards in 
richer countries differ from those of poorer countries? Earthquakes are not more likely to strike 
in poor than in rich countries. Data actually points to the contrary.220 From 1960 to 2005, 759 
destructive earthquakes hit the richer half of the world’s countries while only 502 struck the 
poorer.221 Poverty can provide only a partial explanation as to why certain countries and 
demographics experience disaster while others who experience a similar hazard do not. It is not 
merely poverty which acts as an indicator of disaster mortality, although this is one strong 
marker.222 Rather, there are also numerous institutional and political factors at play in the 
generation of natural disasters.  
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Differing political incentives to mitigate disaster risk interact with intrinsic differences 
between nations. Such differences may include (but are not limited to): economic stability, the 
strength of civil society, imperfect citizen information, corruption, the institutionalization of 
government performance and democracy, ethnic polarization, as well as international pressures. 
These differences each alter the incentives politicians face when choosing where and how to 
enact either preventative or reactive policy measures with respect to natural hazards. Where 
government accountability to the people is relatively high and democratic institutions are strong, 
there will be a higher utility derived from investments in social welfare projects aimed at 
mitigating the effects of a hazard event.223 However, where the rule of law and democratic 
institutions are weak, and therefore governments less accountable to the people, greater utility 
would be derived from consolidating political power and financial resources for self-enrichment. 
Looking at the political history of Nepal, the latter is clearly the scenario faced by the current 
government.  
In Nepal, the relative strength of political institutions and the presence of competitive 
elections are as important in understanding the potential impact of hazards as poverty levels. 
Both competitive elections and strong institutions are important proxies used to gauge political 
market imperfections, which in turn provide a great deal of information regarding peoples’ 
ability to command from government the public goods and services that will enhance social 
welfare to mitigate disaster risk.224 Imperfections such as lack of citizen information and 
awareness, poor political credibility, as well as low levels of intra-government cooperation all 
hinder the efficient allocation of public expenditures towards services. As Keefer and Khemani 
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argue, market imperfections disrupt citizens’ ability to hold government officials accountable, 
even when democratic institutions exist, as is the case in Nepal. Each form of market 
imperfection acts as a strong indicator of how the strength of government may escalate the 
effects of hazards into disasters.  
Employing a variety of governance indicators, the posited inverse correlation between 
governance and natural disasters continues to hold. According to data collected by the World 
Bank, government policy stances alter both private and public disaster preparedness levels, such 
that countries with weak governments (like Nepal) experience higher disaster mortality rates (see 
Figure 2).  In Nepal, weak governance also undermines private incentives to implement disaster 
risk reduction measures (such as constructing earthquake-reinforced buildings or purchasing 
disaster insurance), for property rights and contractual obligations are more ambiguous under 
such a weak rule of law. Therefore, private entities are not inclined to invest in these goods.225 
Even the poverty-disaster link is influenced by political incentives to some degree, seeing as 
governments with few incentives to mitigate disaster mortality also tend to have low incentive to 
work towards poverty alleviation;  doing so would endanger the ruling regime’s monopoly over 
power and lucrative resources.  
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Yet beyond this, ethnic fragmentation in political systems is the greatest obstacle to 
improving Nepal’s resilience against disasters. Studies conducted by Weiner and Field regarding 
electoral politics in Southeast Asia found that identity characteristics along ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious lines overwhelmingly dominate political behavior.226 Important differences in health 
and education outcomes between regions existing within the same nation state are evident in 
countries across the Asian continent: Nepal, Pakistan, India and Thailand to name a few.227 
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While data regarding government expenditures on public goods from an ethnic-regional 
breakdown is difficult to compile for Nepal, it is useful to look towards neighboring India to 
reinforce the potency of ethnic identity politics in creating a people’s vulnerability. 228 There are 
numerous similarities between the two nations, especially regarding difficulties of caste 
marginalization and political exclusion, making them comparable case studies for the purposes 
of this discussion.  
The Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Kerala have nearly identical per capita incomes 
and poverty rates. However, divergences in health and education outcomes are staggering. In 
Kerala, human development indicators are comparable to those of some of the richest nations in 
the world, while in Uttar Pradesh, conditions reflect those of the poorest.229 Research conducted 
by Dreze and Sen is able to shed some light on this puzzle: their analysis found that these stark 
differences in outcomes are attributable to equally disparate per capita public expenditures by 
government.230 Spending in Kerala was more than double that in Uttar Pradesh between 1960 and 
1995. Both states are in the same sovereign nation, adhering to the same formal political and 
legal institutions. Yet, the most significant underlying difference between these regions is the 
dynamics of political competition. In Kerala, citizens’ voter access to information, literacy rates, 
and the credibility of political promises are greater, while ethnic polarization is relatively low.231 
However, Uttar Pradesh is at the opposite end of the spectrum. The region has a literacy rate of 
approximately 18%, limited access to media, and active institutions of social discrimination – all 
of which effectively prevent the stigmatized ‘untouchable’ castes from accessing public services 
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or participating in the political process.232 Kerala’s political parties have been able to compete on 
credible platforms for delivering broad social services (diminishing the importance of patron-
client relationships). Contrastingly, elections in Uttar Pradesh are dominated by clientelist 
platforms, and therefore competitive elections have not developed.233 In Nepal, like in Uttar 
Pradesh, genuinely competitive elections are blocked by the contradicting demands being made 
by various independent political groups, each seeking to represent a marginalized ethnic or caste 
identity.234 Literacy rates and access to media in rural Nepal (regions inhabited by a majority of 
the Dalit, Janajati, and Muslim populations) reflect conditions very similar to those found in 
Uttar Pradesh, and both regions suffer from similarly dismal health and education outcomes. A 
lack of consensus and open dialogue between marginalized groups in both Uttar Pradesh and 
Nepal only further perpetuate the strength of clientelistic platforms to reinforce political 
exclusion. 
Many of the socio-political characteristics inherent to Nepal, like Uttar Pradesh, shed 
light on the important correlation between inequality, social exclusion, political inefficiency and 
the rise of rural peoples’ vulnerability to disasters. Both Nepal and Uttar Pradesh are populated 
by highly illiterate voters (suggesting poor voter information regarding the link between social 
welfare and political decision-making) and are characterized by severe ethnic/caste 
fragmentation. Instances of visible and often coercive social discrimination by government and 
the community are rampant in Uttar Pradesh. Recent reports collected by the World Bank find 
very similar patterns of caste and ethnic discrimination across Nepal, acting most directly against 
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women, Dalit, Janajati and Muslim groups.235 Such active institutions of social discrimination 
effectively prevent ‘backward’ castes from accessing public services or participating in political 
processes.236 Clearly, a single, formalized democratic system can sustain very different types of 
electoral competition and produce starkly different social welfare outcomes. The sheer endurance 
of democracy cannot guarantee that political market imperfections will disappear. The resulting 
policy outcomes have direct implications for the vulnerability of the most marginalized 
demographics in regards to hazard recovery. With this in mind it is clear that in order for the 
Nepalese government to successfully address disaster risk, the state must dramatically improve 
political inclusion and the provision of public goods. However, such measures require that the 
general public are able to force accountability through greater political participation, and at the 
moment the rule of law remains inadequate. At the same time, many of the most disaster-prone 
regions consist of excluded mountain castes with many more pressing, immediate concerns of 
daily subsistence. 
It is currently estimated that 25% of Nepal’s population lives in extreme poverty, and this 
shows little sign of improving in the near future.237 The country’s GDP growth rate has dropped 
from 6% in 2014 down to .6% by the end of 2016, and of this GDP, approximately 32% is in the 
form of remittances.238 Nepal is one of the most impoverished countries in the world. A majority 
of Nepalese citizens lack basic health services, quality education, shelter, and nutrition on a daily 
basis -- not just in the face of extreme crisis. Perpetuating this situation are numerous economic 
and political problems: poor GDP measures, an ever-increasing trade deficit, and a high external 
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debt stock under a political system of utter chaos. All of this is compounded by the recent 
political unrest. Meanwhile, inequality in terms of class, gender, and geography only further 
aggravate the challenges faced by the modern Nepalese state. Approximately 120 ethnic groups 
populate the small landlocked nation, each with a unique religious affiliation, cultural heritage, 
language, and political identity.239  
Geopolitical interests have also severely handicapped the government’s ability to 
establish substantive democratic institutions -- something which would mitigate disaster 
vulnerability for the most at-risk demographics. India and China each have their own political 
incentives for seeking dominance over Nepal. The prominent role which both states have played 
in the earthquake recovery process is best understood as a continuation of increasing competition 
in the region’s geopolitics. While India looks to keep a Hindu Nepal aligned with their interests 
as a buffer between China, the Chinese government hopes to expand its influence in Nepal as a 
way of constraining the border with Tibet. In the immediate aftermath of the quake, India 
pledged $1 billion USD and China just over $500 million USD.240 Especially in the case of India, 
aid donations are being re-routed from the government towards NGOs which are quite likely 
aligned with Indian foreign policy interests.241 Many of these organizations are led by individuals 
with major government positions, yet because a great deal of this incoming aid is not directed 
towards the government itself, a staggering portion of aid money is pocketed.242 
Since the earthquake struck in 2015, a total of $4.4 billion has been pledged by various 
international agencies and foreign governments. Foreign aid has come pouring into Nepal to fund 
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reconstruction efforts, yet only half of the total amount was pledged as grants -- the other half is 
completely loan money. Seeing as substantive democratic practices as well as a corruption-free 
government bureaucracy are not in place, it is likely that the loans pledged by the international 
community may not ever reach the earthquake affected communities. In fact, this money may 
only exacerbate the underlying issues precipitating disaster in the first place. Approximately $2.2 
billion is now in the hands of a weak, corrupt and un-coordinated Nepalese government. This 
increases the incidence of appropriation of funds, while also increasing the national debt. With 
very few substantial sources of income, the current recovery process in Nepal is dominated by 
the racket effect; not only has the government chosen to under-invest in disaster prevention 
(knowing that the international community will come to assist), but has also deliberately avoided 
implementing disaster prevention measures in the most vulnerable areas so as to attract aid 
money as a way of supplementing national income.243  
Such trends can only force the country into a state of greater debt and economic 
vulnerability. In Nepal, the government uses past aid donations as a signal for the amount that 
they can expect during the current earthquake recovery period, thus substituting post-disaster 
relief from the international community for pre-disaster risk reduction measures. 244 This fact 
provides very few incentives for the state to invest in disaster risk-reduction measures, for not 
only are the benefits of such investments hard for citizens to perceive, but they also provide little 
return for a government whose source of political power lies not in authentic democratic 
institutions, but rather in the hands of an elite few. Thus, the economic insecurity which comes 
from aid dumping works to the detriment of the most marginal and excluded populations in 
Nepal. Aid continues to dissuade the government from making important investments in social 
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goods such as early warning systems and enforced building code measures. By loosening the 
budget constraints placed upon government, aid investments should theoretically decrease 
disaster mortality. However, Nepalese households and the government alike, expecting external 
aid after a disaster, often reduce efforts to mitigate disaster outcomes ex-ante and are likewise 
insufficiently vigilant about disaster vulnerability. Data collected by Raschky and Schwindt 
reinforces this point: foreign aid is associated with a lower likelihood that countries will 
experience any deaths from disasters, but if any deaths do occur, foreign aid is associated with a 
stark increase in disaster mortality – especially in the case of floods and earthquakes.245  
In Nepal, foreign aid has, however, made some marginal improvements to disaster 
reduction measures. It has promoted the development of proper building code standards and 
greater safety awareness, especially for hospitals and schools. The World Bank, USAID, and the 
Asian Urban Disaster Preparedness Center have all been instrumental in the creation of these 
safety plans. However, surveys are now finding that these new building codes are failing largely 
due to the incompetency of government regulation and oversight.246 Earthquake-proof buildings 
have been constructed (mostly isolated to Kathmandu), yet failure to supervise the quality of 
building-reinforcement and corner-cutting to save money have counteracted any potential gains 
which these codes could provide.  
The potential safety of proper building code enforcement is immense, and must be 
considered as a central force in Nepal’s excessive disaster risk. According to Alexander et. al., 
over 95% of all deaths in earthquakes result from building failures.247 There is also a strong link 
to be drawn between variations in mortality among different countries and differences in 
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building styles, densities of settlements, as well as enforcement of proper building codes.248 
Understanding the critical role which structural variations play in Nepal’s seismic earthquake 
risk requires that one consider where buildings are likely to fail and also to dissect the root 
causes behind this situation (here it is useful to once more refer to the Pressure and Release 
model by Blaikie et. al.). The earthquake reinforced buildings which now exist in Kathmandu are 
actually very faulty in design and structure in comparison to what is envisioned by the 
Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk Management Project.249 Though less likely to collapse in an 
earthquake, if these buildings do collapse one can expect an even higher mortality rate amongst 
inhabitants.250 Improper building codes and lack of enforcement is due largely to the instability 
of the government apparatus yet is compounded by unregulated and rampant urbanization 
amongst the poorest sectors of society.  
The history of Nepal is one of enduring political unrest, inequality, and poor rule of law. 
Political and economic power in the region continues to be consolidated by the Hindu caste 
system at the expense of the lower caste and ethnic majorities – especially in rural areas. 
Therefore, when these conditions come into contact with a natural shock, like that of the 
earthquake in 2015, natural disasters are imminent. The vulnerability and physical insecurities of 
the rural majorities and urban poor are reproduced through daily acts of exclusion and through 
persisting, institutionalized systems of marginalization against those outside the high-caste 
structure. The next step in creating a more secure Nepal will be to address the root causes of 
disasters. This requires that government and civil society collectively draft a plan of action that 
enhances civilian safety across all regions and which also incorporates all sectors in democratic 
                                                
248 J. Seaman, S. Leivesley and C. Hogg, Epidemiology of Natural Disasters (Basle: Karger, 1984), 10-11. 
249 Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Project Completion Report of the Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk 
Management Project (Bangkok: Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, 2000). 
250 Philip Keefer, Disastrous Consequences: The Political Economy of Disaster Risk Reduction (Washington D.C.: 
The World Bank Group, 2009), 21. 
 
 
 
106 
governance. Perhaps most importantly, governance in Nepal must work to reduce the underlying 
pressures of economic stagnation, inequality, and excessive poverty by restructuring the 
distribution of wealth and enhancing political participation. The state must address both the 
physical hazards of poor building construction alongside the socio-political conditions of 
inequality and political inefficiency, otherwise earthquake mitigation measures cannot be 
successfully realized in Nepal. Without a serious reformation to the governing apparatus, the 
Nepalese people will remain embroiled in a situation of high risk and vulnerability to disaster for 
years to come. 
 
Conclusion: 
Disasters are highly complex material events inextricably linked to the social perceptions 
of a community; they are not products of natural phenomena under the pressures of climate 
change. Rather, natural disasters are a manifestation of the deeply-rooted inequalities and social 
vulnerabilities felt by any given demographic when a hazard strikes. Therefore, unless one is 
capable of understanding the historically-embedded root causes and broader social patterns that 
precipitate people’s vulnerability to disaster (these include: economic inequality, unsafe living 
conditions, and poignant political marginalization, among many others which have been 
addressed throughout this text), it will be impossible to effectively develop a means of 
addressing natural disasters in the twenty-first century. International disaster mitigation efforts 
must analyze not only disasters in general, but rather go a step further and dissect the underlying 
forces that make people and their environment vulnerable to such crises in the first place.  
Each case study analyzed here, Haiti, Ethiopia, and Nepal, all experience natural disasters 
in a unique context, yet there are indeed some overlapping trends. In weak, underdeveloped 
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states such as Nepal or Haiti, disaster prevention and response units are either non-existent or ill 
equipped to address the needs and demands of its citizens. In such instances, it is not uncommon 
for the corrupt incentives of government officials to also precipitate widespread abuse of hazard 
relief aid, exacerbating the outbreak of disaster. Similarly, this analysis has shown that a poor 
history of upholding human rights causes many citizens to accept unsafe living conditions and 
insecure livelihoods. As a direct consequence, people’s access to the resources necessary for 
effective hazard adaptation are often withheld and essential coping mechanisms obstructed. 
Likewise, under conditions where resource extraction and excessive industrial development have 
degraded the natural environment to a point of severe instability, as is the case in Haiti and 
Nepal, hazards such as a monsoon or hurricane can create catastrophic flooding or landslides. In 
Ethiopia, the ill-conceived, top-down reconfiguration of land tenure practices compounded by a 
long history of ethnic conflict, has meant that droughts can easily escalate into full-blown 
disasters. Such patterns are common across the developing world. 
As has been shown, historic processes of isolation, oppression, and exploitation, 
combined with contemporary international power systems, interact in complex ways to affect 
different socioeconomic classes distinctly. The outbreak of disaster thus exposes the moment 
when these instabilities come into contact with an environmental hazard. In order to effectively 
address such debilitating crises, the international community must begin to take preventative, and 
not just reactive measures. Effective action will require that both international institutions and 
governments collectively address disasters as a function of the daily risks which people face that 
heighten their vulnerability.  
In 1990 the United Nations announced the beginning of the International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). The focus of this sponsored decade was to create and 
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maintain a safer environment by encouraging nation states to share and pool resources, thereby 
enhancing access to information, technological expertise, and resilience against severe weather. 
One major objective of the IDNDR has been to improve hazard prediction methods, yet this 
methodology merely pits attention towards the hazards themselves, rather than towards the 
forces which give rise to disasters. While enhanced scientific and financial resources are always 
useful in mitigating risks, this limited approach runs the danger of encouraging top-down 
development efforts that allow empirical data and science to overshadow the needs and 
vulnerabilities of those at greatest risk to disaster.  
Many of the current disaster risk reduction measures adopted by the UN, World Bank, 
and other multilateral stakeholders are not only expensive, but also entirely overlook the root 
causes of disasters themselves. As we have seen in Haiti, it is not merely the hurricane which 
gives rise to a natural disaster. Rather, it is Haiti’s entrenched patterns of authoritarian 
militarism, severe inequality, and the marginalization of the most vulnerable demographics 
which ultimately generate natural disasters from a hazard. If the hazard itself were the root cause 
of disaster, Hurricane Matthew and other similar Caribbean storms would have created much 
more tragic outcomes in the Dominican Republic and neighboring Cuba. These politically and 
economically based patterns of suffering are yet to be effectively acknowledged by the 
international community.  
However, some progress has indeed been made. Since the 1990s, international efforts at 
natural disaster mitigation have been further codified. In 1999 the United Nations drafted a new 
mandate to address the impending threat of natural disasters entitled, The International Strategy 
for Disaster Reduction. In 2001 this mandate was expanded to serve as the focal point in the UN 
system, guaranteeing coordination and synergies among disaster risk reduction activities 
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throughout the UN, as well as with regional humanitarian organizations. To quote the Secretary 
General, this era marked a newfound focus on disaster risk reduction: "We must, above all, shift 
from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. Prevention is not only more humane than 
cure; it is also much cheaper... Above all, let us not forget that disaster prevention is a moral 
imperative, no less than reducing the risks of war".251 In 2015 the Sendai Framework for disaster 
reduction was adopted by the third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. This 
framework is a fifteen-year voluntary, non-binding agreement that delineates a broad, people-
centered approach to disaster risk reduction. The Sendai Framework marks monumental step 
towards alleviating the stresses and strains of people’s vulnerability around the world. The core 
focus of this recent mandate includes ensuring that disaster risk reduction (DRR) is applied to 
climate change adaptation while also increasing key investments in mitigation efforts such as 
building disaster resilient cities, schools, and hospitals, while also strengthening collaboration 
throughout the international system and enhancing coordination.252 
While the Sendai Framework and other UN mandates are indeed steps in the right 
direction, such international developments should be taken with great caution. It is commendable 
and certainly a great achievement that the international community is recognizing the socio-
political roots of natural disasters in the 21st-century, especially as they pertain to economic 
inequalities and cultural biases against vulnerable communities. Yet these institutions must be 
wary of perpetuating the top-down, developmentalist and aid-centric approach to disaster risk 
reduction which has thus far failed to address many of the afflictions underlying people’s 
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vulnerability. By keeping DRR policies and discourse isolated amongst the institutions directing 
the international policy arena, it is unlikely that people’s vulnerability to disaster will be reduced 
in any substantive manner. To effectively address the root causes of natural disasters requires 
that vulnerable people’s access to resources are enhanced through changes in the power relations 
of society. Currently, those who created this global system of inequality and injustice are 
devising the very mechanisms which will supposedly relieve the suffering that their system not 
only created, but which they themselves have never experienced.  Such an approach isolates the 
source of solutions to those at the top of the global power hierarchy. Moving forward, the 
international community must recognize that the primary forces behind active relief consist of 
grass-roots mobilization. Affected communities must work collectively towards their 
empowerment, supporting each other when coping and adapting to environmental changes. 
Under the current IDNDR framework, the impacts of disasters can indeed be diminished to a 
limited extent. However, as previously noted, by addressing disasters through scientific 
modelling and technological adaptations, international DRR agencies focus their efforts 
exclusively on the environmental aspects of the problem and isolate solutions. 
The case studies developed throughout this discussion have made clear the severe need 
for a vulnerability-focused analysis within current international discourses on disaster risk 
reduction.  The pivotal role which socio-political instabilities and economic inequalities play in 
generating the preconditions for disaster cannot be overlooked if the international community is 
to reduce the devastating effects of natural disasters in the era of climate change. To address the 
anthropogenic roots of natural disasters will require that those involved in disaster mitigation 
efforts actively seek to diminish people’s vulnerability through collaborative, cross-sector 
engagement from the bottom-up. Domestic and international actors alike must be open to 
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changing the processes that put people at risk. This means that the environment cannot be made 
safer by technical developments alone. As the perspective put forth in this analysis contends, it is 
indeed possible to make the human environment safer. However, this is only achievable when 
concrete efforts are made to reduce economic and social inequalities, cultural biases, and 
political injustice. The people at risk must be incorporated into the political and economic life of 
their nations and encouraged to participate in substantive democratic processes --such is a right 
afforded to all humans, not a privilege. 
The internationally financed development projects described throughout the case studies 
of this discussion, such as USAID agricultural projects in Haiti, economic development 
programs in Ethiopia, or earthquake relief efforts in Nepal, are designed and directed by large 
international organizations. Inevitably, this means that such projects lack any clear accountability 
mechanisms for human rights and environmental standards. These projects, such as dams, mines, 
and oil pipelines, are notorious for their environmental and human rights impacts, including the 
forced displacement of indigenous people, the poisoning of rivers used for drinking water, the 
exacerbation of corruption, and the perpetuation of sexual abuse against women and children by 
foreign workers. Thus, the very projects meant to lift people out of poverty often have the 
opposite impact. This must change. 
Such is not to say that efforts at global development, poverty alleviation, and disaster risk 
reduction are futile. Vulnerability can indeed be reduced, but only if aid programs are properly 
conceived and implemented so as to actually address the needs of society rather than to preserve 
the industry of NGOs and global development agencies. What is needed is substantive 
engagement of the masses towards their own empowerment. The social, economic, and political 
mechanisms that translate global pressures and unsafe conditions into disasters can be changed 
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and even reversed if the people become active participants in the development of their own 
societies. Like all aspects of the human condition, the transnational pressures which create 
vulnerability should be viewed as flexible concepts, not as immutable and inevitable elements of 
society. Ideally, society will work to enhance the links between popular culture and bureaucracy, 
strengthening the management of high-risk regions so as to incorporate structural as well as 
nonstructural measures for disaster risk reduction.  
Effective disaster management efforts will be pointless if projects continue to be based on 
a hierarchical model that overlooks the needs of the communities they seek to serve. Disasters 
can be reduced only by freeing people from the socio-political and economic constraints they 
face in everyday life. These root causes must be given the same priority as more technical and 
scientific approaches to disaster risk management. Therefore, substantive disaster risk reduction 
measures are only obtainable if the implementation of DRR policies are balanced in a 
participatory system that fully acknowledges the diversity of state and non-state actors 
concerned, working to empower local communities and strengthen democratic institutions across 
the world. Progress has indeed been made, yet still the international community overlooks the 
important implications which political and economic forces play in the overall resilience of a 
population. Natural disasters are indeed one of the greatest threats to human security in the 
modern era. If the global community is to effectively address this imminent threat, a more 
holistic, human rights-focused, and inclusive approach to disaster risk management is necessary.  
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